中央环保督察的信息效应:来自分析师盈余预测的证据  

Information Effect of the Central Environmental Protection Inspection:Evidence from Analyst Earnings Forecasts

作　　者：杨晓艺 李刚[2] YANG Xiaoyi;LI Gang(College of Finance and Taxation,Zhengzhou Technology and Business University,Zhengzhou 451400,China;School of Accounting,Xinjiang University of Finance&Economics,Urumqi 830000,China)

机构地区：[1]郑州工商学院财税学院,河南郑州451400 [2]新疆财经大学会计学院,新疆乌鲁木齐830012

出　　处：《安徽工程大学学报》2025年第1期80-86,共7页Journal of Anhui Polytechnic University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71862030)。

摘　　要：基于分析师盈余预测视角,运用多期双重差分模型探讨中央环保督察制度的资本市场信息效应。实证研究发现,首轮中央环保督察行动后,证券分析师对重污染企业的盈余预测进行了向上修正,支持了环境规制的创新补偿效应大于遵循成本效应。进一步发现,当企业的遵循成本较低时,中央环保督察行动后分析师对重污染企业向上修正盈余预测的幅度更大,并且对重污染企业的盈余预测误差显著降低,支持了中央环保督察为资本市场带来了增量信息。Unlike previous studies,this paper discusses the capital market information effect of the central environmental protection inspection system by using the multi-phase difference-in-differences model based on the perspective of analyst earnings forecast.Empirical research found that after the first round of central environmental inspection,securities analysts revised the earnings forecast of heavy polluting enterprises upward,supporting the innovative compensation effect of environmental regulation is greater than the cost effect.The mechanism inspection shows that the first round of central environmental inspection mainly affects the analyst's earnings forecast by improving the performance of enterprises and reducing the operating risk and other company fundamentals.It is further found that when the cost of compliance is low,the analysts to revise the surplus forecast of heavy polluting enterprises more,after the central environmental inspection action and on the surplus forecast error of heavy polluting enterprises is significantly reduced,proving that the central environmental inspection for the capital market brings incremental information.

关 键 词：中央环保督察 分析师盈余预测 信息效应 环境规制 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275