政府投资基金审计的行为策略与声誉激励效应——基于四方演化博弈分析  

Behavioral Strategy and Reputation Incentive Effect of theof Government Investment Fund Audit:Based on the Four-party Evolutionary Game Analysis

作　　者：后小仙 鲜崇琰 HOU Xiaoxian;XIAN Chongyan(School of Government Audit,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学政府审计学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2025年第2期21-34,共14页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(17BJY001);南京审计大学预研究课题(19ZDYY001);江苏省研究生科研创新计划(KYCX23_2332)。

摘　　要：政府投资基金是加快建设现代化产业体系的重要政策工具,现阶段我国政府投资基金的引导效应尚未充分发挥。引入声誉激励机制,考虑跨部门综合监管的现实情境,构建社会资本、基金管理机构、被投资企业、审计机关共同参与的四方演化博弈模型,分析各博弈主体行为策略选择的稳定性和复制动态系统的策略组合稳定性,并运用真实审计案例及数据进行仿真分析,研究发现,审计监督可以抑制政府投资基金运作中的机会主义行为,缓解信息不对称,并通过声誉传导机制,有效促进基金管理机构积极管理,被投资企业合规投资,进而引导社会资本积极参与,为进一步加强政府投资基金审计工作提供学理性支撑。Government investment fund is an important policy tool to accelerate the construction of a modern industrial system.However,the guiding effect of China’s government investment fund has not yet been fully realized at the present stage.This paper introduces the reputation incentive mechanism,considers the realistic situation of cross-departmental comprehensive supervision,constructs a four-party evolutionary game model for social capital,fund manager,invested enterprise and audit institution,analyzes the stability of the game players strategic choices and possible equilibrium points of the replication dynamic system,and then conducts numerical simulation analysis based on realistic audit project data.The study finds that strengthening the intensity of audit supervision and improving the efficiency of audit supervision can effectively increase the possibility of fund manager s active management behavior and invested enterprise s compliance behavior,and then encourage social capital to actively participate in government investment fund.And this result provides academic support for further strengthening the audit of government investment funds.

关 键 词：政府投资基金 审计机关 行为策略 声誉激励 社会资本 演化博弈 基金治理 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]