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作 者:李志辉[1] 魏斌 陈海龙 LI Zhihui;WEI Bin;CHEN Hailong(School of Economics,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China;Digital Inclusive Center,ICBC,Hangzhou 310000,China)
机构地区:[1]南开大学经济学院,天津300071 [2]中国工商银行数字普惠中心,浙江杭州310000
出 处:《审计与经济研究》2025年第2期73-84,共12页Journal of Audit & Economics
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目(71973070);国家社会科学基金项目(23BJY253);浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题(23NDJC175YB)。
摘 要:以2011—2022年沪深A股非金融上市公司为研究对象,从资金占用和关联交易两个角度实证检验ESG评级对大股东掏空行为的影响及作用机制。研究发现,ESG评级能够显著抑制大股东掏空行为。机制检验结果表明,ESG评级不仅可以通过提升信息透明度(激励内部信息披露和吸引分析师关注)、强化中小股东退出威胁等渠道抑制大股东掏空行为,还能够通过提高内部控制质量来抑制资金占用类掏空行为。异质性分析发现,在高质量法律环境和高股权制衡的情况下,ESG评级对大股东掏空行为的抑制作用更加显著;在国有企业中,ESG评级能够更加显著地抑制大股东通过关联交易掏空公司的行为。研究结论为加强股东治理、保护投资者提供了经验证据,对企业ESG实践和资本市场高质量发展具有重要意义。Protecting the legitimate rights and interests of investors,especially small and medium-sized investors,is an inevitable requirement for the high-quality development of the capital market.Taking A-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2022 as the research object,we empirically examine the impact of ESG ratings on major shareholders tunneling behaviors and its influence mechanism from the perspectives of capital appropriation and connected transactions.It is found that ESG ratings can significantly inhibit major shareholders tunneling behaviors.The impact mechanism test shows that ESG ratings can inhibit major shareholders tunneling behaviors by enhancing information transparency(incentivizing internal disclosure and attracting analysts attention),strengthening the threat of exit for small and medium-sized shareholders,and improving the quality of internal control in order to inhibit capital misappropriation type of tunneling behaviors.Heterogeneity analysis finds that ESG ratings have a more significant inhibitory effect on major shareholders tunneling behaviors in a high-quality legal environment and high equity checks and balances,and that ESG ratings can more significantly inhibit major shareholders tunneling behaviors of the company through connected transactions in state-owned enterprises.The findings provide empirical evidence for strengthening shareholder governance and investor protection,and have great significance for corporate ESG practices and the high-quality development of the capital market.
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