基于演化博弈的突发事件协同研判行为分析  

Analysis on collaborative judgment behavior of emergencies based on evolutionary game

作　　者：王彩萍 马嘉怡 苏畅 邓军 WANG Caiping;MA Jiayi;SU Chang;DENG Jun(School of Safety Science and Engineering,Xi’an University of Science and Technology,Xi’an Shaanxi 710054,China;Key Laboratory of Urban Safety and Emergency Rescue of Shaanxi Province Higher Education Institutions,Xi’an Shaanxi 710054,China;School of Management,Xi’an University of Science and Technology,Xi’an Shaanxi 710054,China)

机构地区：[1]西安科技大学安全科学与工程学院,陕西西安710054 [2]城市安全与应急救援陕西省高等学校重点实验室,陕西西安710054 [3]西安科技大学管理学院,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《中国安全生产科学技术》2025年第3期33-41,共9页Journal of Safety Science and Technology

基　　金：国家重点研发计划项目(2021YFB4000905);教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(22YJCZH171,23YJAZH016,24YJCZH026);新疆维吾尔自治区重点研发计划项目(2022B03031-1)。

摘　　要：为探究突发事件应急管理中多主体协同研判机制对应急决策效能的影响,结合前景理论(PT)与心理账户(MA)理论,通过效价账户和成本账户的价值判断矩阵构建演化博弈的价值感知矩阵,分析突发事件应急管理过程中一线人员、专家和政府官员三方决策主体的交互机制,并通过MATLAB仿真模型分析关键因素对突发事件协同研判行为演化的影响。研究结果表明:协同合作是应急响应效率的核心保障,当三方均采取积极策略时,系统行为演化稳定性最强,应急决策效能最好;行为成本与激励机制显著影响决策偏好,降低行为成本、借助物质激励可有效促进三方协同响应;风险调控是抑制消极行为的关键,提高消极策略的风险系数(如对瞒报、群体盲思实施问责处罚),可推动策略向积极方向演化;价值感知参照点的动态管理能够优化决策路径,通过提高成本参照点(如量化渎职损失)与降低效价期望(如合理设定绩效目标),结合应急知识宣教,激发主动应对意愿。研究结果可为构建更加有效的应急管理体系提供思路,为政策的优化和改进提供科学参考。In order to investigate the influence of multi-subject collaborative judgment mechanism on the effectiveness of emergency decision-making in the emergency management of emergencies,combining the prospect theory(PT)and the mental account(MA)theory,a value perception matrix of evolutionary game was constructed through the value judgment matrix of the potency account and the cost account.The interaction mechanism of three-party decision-making subjects of the frontline personnel,experts and government officials in the emergency management process of emergencies was analyzed,and the influence of key factors on the evolution of the collaborative judgment behavior of emergencies was analyzed by using the MATLAB simulation model.The results show that the collaborative cooperation is the core guarantee of emergency response efficiency,and when all three parties adopt positive strategies,the system behavioral evolution is the most stable,and the emergency decision-making efficiency is the best.The behavioral cost and incentive mechanism significantly affect the decision-making preference,and reducing the behavioral cost or with the help of material incentives can effectively promote the three-party cooperative response.The risk control is the key to inhibit the negative behavior,and increasing the risk coefficients of negative strategies(e.g.,imposing accountability penalties for underreporting and group blindness)can promote the evolution of strategies in a positive direction.The dynamic management of value-perceived reference points can optimize the decision-making path,and by increasing the cost reference points(e.g.,quantifying the loss of malfeasance)and lowering the expectation of effectiveness(e.g.,reasonably setting the performance target),combined with the publicity and education of emergency knowledge,it can stimulate the willingness to actively respond.The research results can provide ideas for the construction of a more effective emergency management system,and provide scientific basis for the optimization and

关 键 词：突发事件协同研判 前景理论 心理账户理论 演化博弈 仿真分析 

分 类 号：X915.2[环境科学与工程—安全科学]