F2C模式下农产品质量的三方演化博弈及仿真研究  

Research on Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Agricultural Product Quality Under F2C Model

作　　者：姜楠 张敬唯 李虎峰 赖启福[1] JIANG Nan;ZHANG Jing-wei;LI Hu-feng;LAI Qi-fu(School of Economics and Management,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou,Fujian 350002,China;School of Business Administration,Huaqiao University,Quanzhou,Fujian 362021,China)

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350002 [2]华侨大学工商管理学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《台湾农业探索》2024年第6期38-50,共13页Taiwan Agricultural Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金高校思政课研究专项(23VSZ100)。

摘　　要：【目的/意义】以F2C为代表的电商模式向农业领域不断拓展,一定程度上提升了农产品质量。但“产品质量信号+投标金额”的排名机制和“赢家通吃”的模式可能引发投机和低质量风险,影响农产品质量安全。分析电商平台、农户和消费者三者间实现高质量农产品供给的条件及均衡状态,以期给出更具针对性的建议,助力农产品质量和销量提升。【方法/过程】采用Python进行仿真实验和数值模拟,构建电商平台、农户和消费者三方演化博弈模型,分析各主体初始意愿和不同要素对三方策略选择的影响。【结果/结论】电商平台和农户的初始意愿会对演化博弈的最终结果产生重要影响;电商平台查处概率的增加能够对农户起到很好的威慑作用,推动演化博弈更快地趋于理想状态;消费者行为难以对演化博弈的收敛方向产生影响,只能被动接受电商平台和农户提供的产品信息。据此提出建议:建立多样奖励机制;提高检验效率和降低成本;实施必要的约束措施;建立消费者反馈机制。【Objective/Meaning】The e-commerce model represented by F2C has been continuously expanded to the agricultural field,which has improved the quality of agricultural products to a certain extent.However,the ranking mechanism of“product quality signal+bidding amount”and the“winner-take-all”model may lead to speculation and low quality risks,affecting the quality security of agricultural products.By analyzing the conditions and equilibrium state of the supply of high-quality agricultural products among the e-commerce platform,farmers and consumers,it aimed to give more targeted suggestions to help improve the quality and sales of agricultural products.【Methods/Procedures】In this paper,Python was used to carry out the simulation experiments and numerical simulations,and then the tripartite evolutionary game model of e-commerce platform,peasant households and consumers was constructed to analyze the influence of the initial willingness of each subject and different factors on the choice of tripartite strategies.【Results/Conclusions】The initial willingness of the e-commerce platform and peasant households would have an important impact on the final result of the evolutionary game;the increase in the probability of investigation and punishment of e-commerce platform could play a good deterrent role for farmers and promote the evolutionary game to approach the ideal state faster;the consumer behavior was difficult to affect the convergence direction of the evolutionary game,and could only passively accept the product information provided by the e-commerce platform and farmers.Based on this,some countermeasures were put forward,including establishing a variety of incentive mechanisms,improving the inspection efficiency and reducing the costs,implementing the necessary constraint measures,and establishing the feedback mechanism of consumers.

关 键 词：F2C 农产品质量 农村电商 演化博弈 建模与仿真 

分 类 号：F304.3[经济管理—产业经济] F224