“逆向信息不对称”:环境治理中的信息获取与层级控制  

“Reverse Information Asymmetry”:Information Acquisition and Bureaucratic Control in Environmental Governance

作　　者：夏瑛[1] 李琳玮 Xia Ying;Li Linwei

机构地区：[1]中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院,广州510006 [2]中山大学粤港澳发展研究院,广州510006

出　　处：《广东社会科学》2025年第2期183-194,288,共13页Social Sciences in Guangdong

摘　　要：信息不对称广泛存在于政府层级体系中。主流理论认为,中央政府难以通过强化信息获取手段来解决信息不对称问题。学者们转而探讨通过制度设计来应对纵向治理中的信息挑战。以环保垂直管理改革后中国环境治理过程中的信息获取为例,本研究界定了“逆向信息不对称”这一在纵向政府组织体系中日益显现的现象。与下级政府掌握信息优势的“信息不对称”不同,“逆向信息不对称”描述的是上级政府通过多种手段争取信息优势的过程。研究发现,中央政府通过制度改革、技术赋能和民意直通等多种方式获取地方政府尚未掌握的地方信息,打破了地方政府垄断信息优势的传统假设。多维信息的获取有助于中央政府构建关于下级政府行为的“信息拼图”,并缩小其相对于下级政府的信息劣势。“逆向信息不对称”强化了科层体系中上级组织的权威与层级控制能力,从而进一步提高了特定政策领域的执行效率。Information asymmetry is pervasive within bureaucratic systems.Mainstream theories posit that central government could barely resolve such asymmetry through enhanced information acquisition measures.Scholars have instead shifted focus to institutional design as a means to address informational challenges in vertical governance.Taking the post-reform era of environmental vertical management in China as a case study,this research delineates the emerging phenomenon of“reverse information asymmetry”within vertical governmental frameworks.Unlike conventional“information asymmetry,”where subordinate governments hold informational advantages,“reverse information asymmetry”describes the process by which superior governments actively secure informational dominance through diversified strategies.The study reveals that the central government employs institutional reforms,technology empowerment,and direct channels for public feedback to acquire local information beyond the grasp of local governments,thereby challenging the traditional assumption of local monopolization over informational advantages.Multidimensional information acquisition enables the central government to get more comprehensive knowledge regarding subordinate governments’conduct,narrowing its informational disadvantage relative to lower-tier entities.“Reverse information asymmetry”reinforces the authority and control capacity of superior actors within bureaucratic systems,thereby enhancing policy implementation efficiency in specific domains.

关 键 词：环境治理 信息不对称 逆向信息不对称 信息获取 层级控制 

分 类 号：C916[经济管理]