基于微分博弈的国家水网污染治理成本分担机制研究  

Study on the Cost-sharing Mechanism of Pollution Management in National Water NetworksBased on Differential Games

作　　者：杨阳 杨耀红 杨舒雯 YANG Yang;YANG Yao-hong;YANG Shu-wen(School of Water Conservancy,North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power,Zhengzhou 450046,China)

机构地区：[1]华北水利水电大学水利学院,郑州450046

出　　处：《价值工程》2025年第9期77-81,共5页Value Engineering

摘　　要：考虑水网中的水质差异实际情况,以南水北调引江补汉为例,基于成本分担机制构建微分博弈模型,研究引江补汉供水方、汉江中下游的排污企业与引水企业之间的水污染协调治理问题。结果表明:①随着单位治污努力污染物消除量增加,各方都将自发提高污染物治理的积极性,污染物处理量增加且成本分担率相应提升。②随着单位污染物损失系数增加,供水方和排污企业的努力程度都增加且成本分担率相应提升。Considering the actual situation of water quality differences in the water network,this paper taking the South-to-North Water Diversion Project and Yangtze-to-Hanjiang River Water Diversion Project as an example,a differential game model is constructed to analyze the cost-sharing mechanism of pollution management.The results show that:①With the increase of the amount of pollutants eliminated per unit of pollution control effort,all parties will spontaneously increase their enthusiasm for pollutant control,the amount of pollutants treated will increase,and the overall cost sharing rate will show a downward trend.②With the increase of the unit pollutant loss coefficient,the efforts of the water supply party and the pollutant discharge enterprises will increase and the cost sharing rate will increase accordingly.

关 键 词：国家水网 水质差异 微分博弈 污染治理 成本分担 

分 类 号：TV213.4[水利工程—水文学及水资源]