数字税模拟实施对平台企业自我优待行为防范研究——基于演化博弈视角的分析  

Research on the Prevention of Platform Enterprises’Self-preferential Behavior under the Simulated Implementation of Digital Tax——Analysis from the perspective of evolutionary game

作　　者：朱霞[1] 胡俊杰 ZHU Xia;HU Junjie

机构地区：[1]桂林电子科技大学商学院

出　　处：《价格理论与实践》2024年第6期166-171,共6页Price:Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家社科项目“中国参与数字税国际规则制定的策略与实现路径研究”(21BGJ027);桂林电子科技大学研究生教育创新计划项目(2023YCXS097)

摘　　要：近年来,我国大型互联网平台企业利用数据垄断优势实施数据型自我优待的行为频繁发生。本文从数字税的视角出发,通过构建政府部门与平台企业的博弈模型,分析征收数字税后双方的演化稳定策略。研究表明:平台企业实施数据型自我优待的概率与该策略的综合收益正相关;政府部门征收数字税的概率与该策略带来的整体社会综合收益正相关。基于此,本文提出谋划数字税征管新体系、促进平台数据流通共享、清晰数据的产权属性等措施,以促进平台经济健康有序发展。In recent years,large Internet platform enterprises in China have frequently implemented data-based self-favoritism by taking advantage of their data monopoly.This article starts from the perspective of digital tax,and analyzes the evolutionary stable strategies of both parties after the imposition of digital tax by constructing a game model between government departments and platform enterprises.Research shows that the probability of platform enterprises implementing data-based self-preferential treatment is positively correlated with the comprehensive benefits of this strategy;The probability of the government levying digital taxes is positively correlated with the overall social comprehensive benefits brought by the strategy.Based on this,this article proposes measures such as planning a new system for digital tax collection and management,promoting the circulation and sharing of platform data,and clarifying the property rights of data,in order to promote the healthy and orderly development of the platform economy.

关 键 词：数字税 互联网平台企业 数据垄断 数据型自我优待 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] F812.42F224.32