从关系到市场:腐败治理与审计需求  

From Guanxi to Market:Anti-corruption and Audit Demand

作　　者：荣祉翔 夏立军[2] Rong Zhixiang;Xia Lijun

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,100084 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,200030

出　　处：《会计研究》2024年第12期150-165,共16页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自科基金重点项目(72132006);国家自科基金面上项目(72072115)的阶段性研究成果;国家社科基金重点项目(22AZD034)

摘　　要：长期以来,中国资本市场对高质量审计的需求相对缺乏,这也是导致财务造假与审计失败频发的关键原因。然而,为什么中国资本市场缺乏对高质量审计的需求,文献中尚无定论。本文尝试从腐败治理的视角考察上市公司所处的关系型营商环境对资本市场高质量审计需求不足的影响。采用2007年至2022年期间中国A股上市公司样本,研究发现,上市公司所在地区首次有中央巡视组入驻或地方高官落马后,当地有政企关联的上市公司聘任高质量会计师事务所的可能性均显著提高。研究结果表明,关系型营商环境降低了上市公司对高质量审计的需求,而腐败治理则有助于提高上市公司对高质量审计的需求。The insufficient demand for high-quality audits in China's capital market has long been a key factor contributing to the frequent occur⁃rence of financial fraud and audit failures.However,the reasons behind the lack of demand for high-quality audits in the Chinese capital market remain a topic of debate.This paper explores how the guanxi-based business environment in which listed companies operate affects the lack of demand for highquality audits in the Chinese capital market,with a focus on the role of anti-corruption.Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2022,the study finds that the likelihood of appointing high-quality auditors among politically connected companies increases following the intervention of the Central Inspection Team or the downfall of high-ranking officials in the region.The findings suggest that a guanxi-based business environment reduces the demand for high-quality audits,while anti-corruption increases it.

关 键 词：审计需求 营商环境 政企关联 腐败治理 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F239.4[政治法律—政治学] D262.6[政治法律—中共党史]