政府奖惩机制下医药企业Moran生产策略分析  

Pharmaceutical Enterprises’Drug Quality Moran Process Strategy under Government Rewards and Punishments

作  者:朱立龙 徐艳萍[1,2] Zhu Lilong;Xu Yanping(School of Business,Shandong Normal University,Jinan 250014;Quality Research Center,Shandong Normal University,Jinan 250014)

机构地区:[1]山东师范大学商学院,济南250014 [2]山东师范大学质量研究中心,济南250014

出  处:《管理评论》2025年第2期214-223,共10页Management Review

基  金:国家社会科学基金一般项目(20BGL272);山东省自然科学基金面上项目(ZR2024MG048)。

摘  要:药品质量是确保公众健康、推动经济发展和维护社会稳定的关键因素,历来受到政府和社会的高度重视。近年来,药品安全问题的频繁发生暴露出政府部门在药品监管和药品检测方面的不足。本文基于政府奖惩考虑寻租行为下生产同种药品的N家医药企业生产选择策略的演化轨迹。通过构建Moran过程随机演化博弈模型,计算出在期望收益主导和外界因素主导下生产高质量药品策略和生产低质量药品策略互相侵入的概率,并利用Matlab 2022进行仿真分析。研究发现:(1)当寻租成本高于某一临界值时,无论医药企业数量高低与否,生产高质量药品策略始终占优,且在强选择条件下寻租成本具有更高的临界值;(2)当高质量药品的生产成本高于低质量药品的生产成本和损失之和时,只有医药企业数量低于某一临界值,生产高质量药品策略才占优;(3)只有当政府惩罚额大于一定的临界值时,生产高质量药品策略才会成为所有医药企业的普遍共识,当惩罚额较低时,群体中会存在两策略共存的现象;(4)期望收益主导下,医药企业寻租成本高于药品质量提升成本时,生产高质量药品策略成为占优策略。最后,结合随机演化博弈过程和仿真结果,为我国医药企业药品质量水平的提升提出了对策与建议。Drug quality is a key factor in ensuring public health,promoting economic development,maintaining social stability and safeguarding national security,and has always been highly valued by the government and society.In recent years,the frequent occurrence of drug safety issues has exposed the shortcomings of government departments in supervision and the inadequacy of drug testing mechanisms.Drawing upon the framework of government rewards and punishments,this paper delves into the evolutionary trajectory of production selection strategies employed by pharmaceutical enterprises manufacturing identical drugs,particularly in the context of rent-seeking behaviors.By constructing a Moran process stochastic evolutionary game model,the probability of mutual invasion between the strategy of producing high-quality drugs and the strategy of producing low-quality drugs under the dominance of expected income and external factors is calculated.Simulation analysis is conducted using Matlab 2022.The research finds that:first of all,when the rent-seeking cost is higher than a certain critical value,producing high-quality drugs will become a dominant strategy in the sector,and the critical value of rent-seeking cost is higher under the dominance of expected returns.Secondly,when the government exerts a high penalty,producing high-quality drugs is more likely to become an evolutionary stable strategy.With the decrease of the penalty amount,the strategy of producing low-quality drugs gradually invades the strategy of producing high-quality drugs.Thirdly,when the production cost of high-quality drugs is higher than the sum of the production costs and losses of low-quality drugs,the strategy of producing high-quality drugs will prevail only if the number of pharmaceutical companies is below a certain critical value.What’s more,for small populations,under the dominance of expected returns,the strategy of producing high-quality drugs keeps dominant.Under the dominance of random factors,the dominant strategy depends on the intensity of

关 键 词:政府奖惩 寻租行为 药品质量监管 Moran过程 演化博弈 

分 类 号:F42[经济管理—产业经济]

 

参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

耦合文献:

正在载入数据...

 

引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

同被引文献:

正在载入数据...

 

相关期刊文献:

正在载入数据...

相关的主题
相关的作者对象
相关的机构对象