政府监管下“农超对接”供应链韧性投入行为与治理研究  

Research on the Resilience Investment Behavior and Governance of the Supply Chain in the“Farming-Supermarket”Docking under Government Regulation

作　　者：陈志新[1] 王源 焦德颖 Chen Zhixin;Wang Yuan;Jiao Deying(School of Logistics,Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149)

机构地区：[1]北京物资学院物流学院,北京101149

出　　处：《管理评论》2025年第2期249-262,共14页Management Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(22BGL030)。

摘　　要：当前供应链韧性成为影响农户和超市对接稳定和供应链长远发展的重要因素。分析发现,农户和超市的博弈面临“囚徒困境”,进行投入一方的决策会受不进行投入一方的影响,甚至出现搭便车行为,演化博弈向双方均不进行投入的方向演化概率更高。因此,本文引入政府作为治理方,加强对韧性投入行为的引导。以政府为监管主体,建立政府、超市以及农户组成的三方演化博弈模型,同时提出“韧性效益值”概念并引入政-农-超三方演化博弈模型。通过讨论“农超对接”系统演化趋势并分析最终演化稳定策略,研究影响农超采取韧性投入决策、政府采取不同监管策略的因素,分析在政府采取不同的监管策略下农超双方采取相应的韧性投入行为的概率,提出政府治理“农超对接”韧性投入行为的对策建议,为政府推进韧性城市建设提供支持。政府采取合理的治理措施能促使农超双方积极进行韧性投入,进而使政府、农户、超市三方主体形成良性互动。结论和建议对抵御当前的扰动风险和潜在的破坏性突发事件进而提升“农超对接”供应链韧性有参考价值。At present,supply chain resilience has become an important factor affecting the stable connection between farmers and supermarkets,as well as the long-term development of the supply chain.Analysis shows that the game between farmers and supermarkets faces a“prisoner’s dilemma”,where the decision of the investing party is influenced by the decision of the non-investing party,and even free riding behavior occurs.The probability of the evolutionary game evolving towards the direction where neither party invests is higher.Therefore,this paper introduces the government as the governance party to strengthen the guidance of resilient investment behavior,and establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of the government,supermarkets and farmers,with the government as the regulatory body.At the same time,the concept of“resilience benefit value”is proposed and a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government,farmers and supermarkets is introduced.By discussing the evolution trend of the“Farming-Supermarket”Docking system and analyzing the final stable evolution strategy,this study investigates the factors that affect the resilience investment decisions of farmers and supermarkets,as well as the different regulatory strategies adopted by the government.It analyzes the probability of farmers and supermarkets adopting corresponding resilience investment behaviors under different regulatory strategies adopted by the government,and proposes countermeasures and suggestions for the government to govern the resilience investment behavior of“Farming-Supermarket”Docking,empowering the government to promote resilience development.The government’s adoption of reasonable governance measures can encourage both farmers and supermarkets to actively engage in resilience investment,thereby forming a positive interaction among the government,farmers and supermarkets.The conclusions and suggestions have reference value for resisting current disturbance risks and potential destructive emergencies,and im

关 键 词：农超对接 供应链韧性 韧性投入 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]