超级平台“扼杀式并购”反垄断治理路径研究  

On the Antitrust Regulation of“Stifling Mergers and Acquisitions”by Super Platforms

作　　者：何冰冰 HE Bingbing(Law School,Central South University,Changsha 410083,Hunan,China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学法学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《韶关学院学报》2025年第1期37-43,共7页Journal of Shaoguan University

基　　金：湖南省教育厅科学研究项目(23A0013)。

摘　　要：“扼杀式并购”是超级平台在新业态下扩张资本的典型方式,在并购目的、并购主体、并购态度和并购手段上区别于传统的经营者集中。我国新《反垄断法》在面对超级平台“扼杀式并购”时存在着事前申报制度不具适应性、传统竞争效果评估方式失灵、反垄断执法机构调查权空设和监管力度不足的困境。为有效治理超级平台“扼杀式并购”,必须补充事前申报审查制度,革新竞争效果评估方式,落实反垄断执法机构的调查权,构建长效且有力的监管制度。“Strangling merger and acquisition”is a typical way for super platforms to expand capital under new business conditions,which differs from traditional operator concentration in purpose,subject,attitude and means.In the face of super platform“stifling mergers and acquisitions”,Chinese new Anti-monopoly Law has some difficulties,such as inadaptability of the pre-declaration system,failure of the traditional competition effect evaluation method,empty investigation power of anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and insufficient supervision.In order to effectively control the super platform“stifle mergers and acquisitions”,it is necessary to supplement the pre-declaration review system,innovate the competition effect assessment method,implement the investigation power of anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies,and build a long-term and powerful regulatory system.

关 键 词：数字经济 超级平台 扼杀式并购 反垄断 

分 类 号：D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]