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作 者:梁平汉[1] 刘洪志 陈雨萱 LIANG Pinghan;LIU Hongzhi;CHEN Yuxuan(Center for Chinese Public Administration Research,Sun Yat-sen University;School of Government,Sun Yat-sen University)
机构地区:[1]中山大学中国公共管理研究中心、政治与公共事务管理学院 [2]中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院
出 处:《公共管理评论》2024年第4期28-49,共22页China Public Administration Review
基 金:国家社会科学基金研究和阐释党的十九届六中全会精神重点项目“构建和巩固亲清政商关系研究”(项目批准号:22AZD033);国家社科基金重大项目“现代信息技术驱动的我国营商环境优化研究”(项目批准号:20&ZD071)的资助。
摘 要:行政负担影响政府绩效和公信力,数字政府被认为是降低行政负担的重要手段,但数字政府影响行政负担转移和分担的理论机制尚不明确。本文基于A区税务部门数字政府改革过程的案例,对行政负担的生成逻辑作出了解释。本文基于合同理论,并结合行政负担定义中的“摩擦”“强加性成本”与“繁重体验”三种诠释,分析了行政负担生成的逻辑。政府组织的不完全合同,包括其正式的组织规章部分和非正式的影子合约部分,以及政府外部的政府-民众隐性合约,这三类合约之间的冲突导致了行政负担的产生。数字政府改革并未大幅度改变产生行政负担的这三类合同,反而带来了更多的合约之间的冲突,从而蕴含着进一步加重行政负担的可能。Administrative burden affects government performance and credibility.It is widely believed that digital government may reduce administrative burden.However,since the patterns and sources of administrative burden have not been fully illustrated,the theoretical logic underlying digital government and administrative burden is still unclear.Based on contract theory,we view administrative burden as the costs imposed by the frictions among conflicting behavioral norms in the government-citizen interactions.From the perspective of those bearing the administrative burden,the most desirable norms are not followed,so the experience of policy implementation becomes onerous to them.This definition combines the existing interpretations of administrative burden as“friction”,“imposition”,and“onerous experiences”.The conflicting norms relate to the incomplete contract within government organizations,including the formal part consisting of organization rules and informal part consisting of shadow contracts,and different implicit contracts in government-citizen interactions,including the ones that call for respects for public interest and effective public services,and the ones that allow street-level bureaucrats to muddle through,sometimes by imposing costs on the citizens.Taking the digital government reform process in district A as example,we show that digital government reform leads to administrative burden in newer forms by 3 different ways.Each norm available in the government-citizen interactions between the tax office and industries in district A could be viewed as a salient focal point in the coordination games of tax business.Digital government reform could impose burden by setting a new game to play,decreasing the payoffs in the equilibrium of the game,or even motivating a deviation to non-equilibrium outcomes.Various apps and tools applied in the reform lead to larger learning costs to the taxpayers.However,when the taxpayers turn to the tax office for help,the bureaucrats refuse to follow the implicit norms
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