Evolutionary Game Analysis of Profit Distribution Between Government and Enterprises in Public Data Authorization Operations  

作　　者：Qing YU Ying LIU Fangyuan SU Muran YU Zhen WANG Xueyao YUAN 

机构地区：[1]School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Science,Beijing 100190,China [2]Huade Smart Energy Management(Tianjin)Co.,Ltd,Tianjin 301799,China [3]Center for Sustainable Development and Global Competitiveness,Stanford University,Stanford,CA 94305,USA [4]School of Economics and Management,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science and Information》2025年第1期1-22,共22页系统科学与信息学报(英文)

基　　金：Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72272140,72334006,72192843)。

摘　　要：To address the issue of revenue distribution between government departments and enterprises in the operation of public data authorization,an evolutionary game model was constructed for both government and enterprise parties.The impacts of different incentive levels and revenue distribution ratios on the strategic choices and evolutionary trends of both government and enterprise were analyzed.It was found that when the government chose a strategy of weak authorization and strong regulation,enterprises showed a higher tendency to actively participate in public data sharing.In addition,when the revenue distribution ratio between government and enterprise was 3:7,the game evolution of both parties tended to be stable,reaching a balanced state that is beneficial and sustainable for both parties.

关 键 词：public data authorized operation income distribution evolutionary game model 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济]