检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:洪名勇[1] 曹豪爽 HONG Mingyong;CAO Haoshuang(School of Economics,Guizhou University)
机构地区:[1]贵州大学经济学院
出 处:《中国农村观察》2025年第2期69-82,共14页China Rural Survey
基 金:国家自然科学基金地区科学基金项目“空间距离、关系强度与农地流转契约履约机制研究”(编号:72163003)。
摘 要:空间兼具自然属性与社会属性,空间的自然属性为经济活动提供场域,而空间的社会属性左右经济活动参与者的博弈互动。本文利用贵州省湄潭县群丰村农地流转契约实施机制选择的案例,构建“空间-惩罚-实施”的分析框架,考察空间距离对农地流转契约实施机制选择的影响机理。研究发现:空间距离影响行为人对违约人施加私权力惩罚、第三方私权力惩罚、公权力惩罚和集体权力惩罚的能力。不同空间距离下的惩罚组合引致差异化的契约实施方式。当空间距离为近邻时,私权力惩罚促使农户选择契约的自我实施;当空间距离为本组时,私权力惩罚、集体权力惩罚促使农户选择契约的自我实施;当空间距离为本村时,第三方私权力惩罚、集体权力惩罚促使农户选择乡贤作为监督方的契约第三方实施;当空间距离为本县时,公权力惩罚促使农户选择村干部作为监督方的契约第三方实施。随着空间距离由近邻向本组、本村和本县扩大,农户的契约实施机制选择倾向由自我实施转向第三方实施。Space possesses both natural and social attributes;its natural attributes provide the setting for economic activities,while its social attributes influence the interactions and strategies of economic participants.However,scholarly investigation into the impact of space on rural economies,particularly regarding its mechanisms influencing the implementation of agricultural land transfer contracts,is insufficient.To enhance research in this area,the author conducted field visits and collected relevant data through semi-structured interviews.This paper presents a case study of the contract implementation mechanism choices in Qunfeng Village,Meitan County,Guizhou Province,establishing an analytical framework of“space–punishment–implementation”to explore the mechanism by which spatial distance affects the choice of implementation mechanisms for agricultural land transfer contracts.The research reveals that spatial distance affects actors’ability to impose private power punishment on violators,third-party private power punishment,public power punishment,and collective power punishment.Different combinations of punishments based on varying spatial distances lead to differentiated contract implementation methods.When spatial distance is that of neighbors,private power punishment encourages farmers to choose self-implementation of contracts.When spatial distance is within the same group,both private power punishment and collective power punishment promote self-implementation of contracts.When spatial distance is within the same village,third-party private power punishment and collective power punishment encourage farmers to select local reputable individuals as supervising third parties for contract implementation.When the spatial distance extends to the county level,public power punishment leads farmers to opt for village officials as supervising third parties.As spatial distance increases from neighbors to groups,villages,and counties,farmers’preferences for contract implementation mechanisms shift from self-
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.49