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作 者:何彬斌[1,2] HE Binbin(Research Department,Yancheng Party School of CPC,Yancheng Jiangsu 224003,China;Business School,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang Jiangsu 202013,China)
机构地区:[1]中共盐城市委党校科研处,江苏盐城224003 [2]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013
出 处:《盐城工学院学报(社会科学版)》2025年第1期54-58,共5页Journal of Yancheng Institute of Technology(Social Science Edition)
基 金:盐城市社科基金项目(24skA276)。
摘 要:技术创新已经成为国有企业混合所有制改革的关键任务。将溢出效应、混改程度、研发补贴等因素一起纳入分析框架,构建了一个三阶段Stackelberg序贯博弈模型,研究并讨论了不同政策下国有企业混合所有制改革的研发环境和经济效果。结论表明:第一,溢出效应的存在削弱了研发主体的收益,会抑制国有企业的研发动力;第二,在没有政府研发补贴的情形下,混改程度与社会总福利呈倒U型关系,此时混合所有制改革难以激励混改企业开展研发活动;第三,当政府研发补贴投向国有企业后,混合所有制改革可以加速激励混改企业加大研发投入,推动全行业的技术溢出和技术进步。最后,给出了政府研发补贴政策和混合所有制改革设计的相关建议。Technological innovation has become a key task in state-owned enterprise mixed ownership reform.This study incorpo-rates spillover effects,reform degree,and R&D subsidies into an analytical framework,constructing a three-stage Stackelberg se-quential game model to examine the R&D environment and economic effects of mixed ownership reform under different policies.The findings indicate that:First,spillover effects reduce R&D returns and inhibit state-owned enterprises'R&D motivation;Sec-ond,without government R&D subsidies,the relationship between reform degree and total social welfare follows an inverted U-shape,making it difficult for mixed ownership reform to stimulate R&D activities;Third,when government R&D subsidies are di-rected to state-owned enterprises,mixed ownership reform can accelerate R&D investment and promote industry-wide technolog-ical spillovers and advancement.Based on these conclusions,recommendations are provided for government R&D subsidy poli-cies and mixed ownership reform design.
分 类 号:F014[经济管理—政治经济学]
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