考虑再保险的巨灾保险参与主体演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary game analysis of catastrophe insurance participants considering reinsurance

作　　者：张节松 孙云飞 ZHANG Jie-song;SUN Yun-fei(School of Economics and Management,Huaibei Normal University,Huaibei 235000,China)

机构地区：[1]淮北师范大学经济与管理学院,安徽淮北235000

出　　处：《青海师范大学学报(自然科学版)》2025年第1期84-93,共10页Journal of Qinghai Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSKY2023D022)。

摘　　要：在现有研究考虑居民、保险公司和政府三方主体参与巨灾保险的基础上,将再保险公司纳入巨灾保险体系,构建四方演化博弈模型,并分析各参与主体在不同场景下的最优策略以及影响体系均衡的因素.研究发现:(1)与三方主体博弈演化情形不同,政府的参与不再促使保险公司选择不合作策略.(2)随着惩罚力度的不断增加,均衡点会发生转移,其中政府的策略选择由不合作策略转向合作策略,居民、保险公司和再保险公司始终选择合作策略且向均衡点演化的速率不断增加.(3)随着再保险公司初始参与意愿的提高,政府的参与意愿不断降低.(4)政府可通过增加居民、保险公司补贴比例的方式,提升巨灾保险体系向均衡点演化的速率.最后通过数值模拟仿真,验证了以上结论的有效性.Based on the existing research considering the participation of residents,insurance companies,and governments in catastrophic insurance,reinsurance companies are included in the catastrophic insurance system,a four party evolutionary game model is constructed,and the optimal strategies of each participating entity in different scenarios and the factors affecting the equilibrium of the system are analyzed.Research has found that:(1)Unlike the evolution of a three party game,government participation no longer prompts insurance companies to choose non cooperative strategies.(2)As the punishment intensity continues to increase,the equilibrium point will shift,with the government’s strategic choices shifting from non cooperative strategies to cooperative strategies,and the rate at which residents,insurance companies,and reinsurance companies evolve towards the equilibrium point continues to increase.(3)As the initial willingness of reinsurance companies to participate increases,the government’s willingness to participate continues to decrease.(4)The government can increase the proportion of subsidies for residents and insurance companies to accelerate the evolution of the catastrophic insurance system towards equilibrium.Finally,the article validated the validity of the above conclusions through numerical simulations.

关 键 词：巨灾保险 演化博弈 模拟仿真 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F842.64[经济管理—保险]