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作 者:杨洋[1] 马丹丹 刘子妮 YANG Yang;MA Dandan;LIU Zini(School of Management,China University of Mining and Technology(Beijing),Beijing 100083,China)
机构地区:[1]中国矿业大学(北京)管理学院,北京100083
出 处:《上海海事大学学报》2025年第1期96-103,共8页Journal of Shanghai Maritime University
基 金:国家社会科学基金(22BGL110)。
摘 要:针对当前网络货运中存在的实际承运人降低服务水平、不按时送达等影响价值共创水平的问题,建立以信用度为中心的奖惩机制。在对实际承运人信用度进行测算的基础上,对参与价值共创的网络货运平台和实际承运人的行为策略进行演化博弈分析,观察不同条件下博弈主体的演化稳定策略。结果表明,博弈双方的策略选择与实际承运人信用度、奖惩力度、协同收益水平、协同损失水平等紧密相关。基于分析结果,从信用管理、奖惩措施、价值共创三个方面对网络货运平台构建可持续的价值共创机制提出对策建议。In view of the problems existing in the current network freight transportation,such as actual carriers reducing the service level and not delivering on time,which affect the level of value co-creation,a creditworthiness-centered reward and punishment mechanism is established.On the basis of measuring the creditworthiness of actual carriers,evolutionary game analysis of behavioral strategies of network freight transportation platforms and actual carriers involved in value co-creation is carried out to observe evolutionary stability strategies of the game agents under different conditions.The results show that the strategic choices of both sides of the game are closely related to carrier creditworthiness,reward and punishment strength,the level of collaborative income,the level of collaborative loss.Based on the analysis results,countermeasures and suggestions are put forward for network freight transportation platforms to build a sustainable value co-creation mechanism from three aspects:credit management,reward and punishment measures,and value co-creation.
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