政府补贴下考虑企业社会责任的低碳供应链决策  

Low-carbon Supply Chain Decision-making with Corporate SocialResponsibility under Government Subsidies

作　　者：苏晓芳 薛濡壕 SU Xiao-fang;XUE Ru-hao(Department of Economics and Management,Yuncheng University,Yuncheng 044011,China)

机构地区：[1]运城学院经济管理系,运城044011

出　　处：《青岛大学学报(自然科学版)》2025年第1期86-93,共8页Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：山西省哲学社会规划课题(批准号:2023YY288)资助;运城学院校级项目(批准号:XJ2023003201)资助。

摘　　要：在低碳供应链中,制造商生产低碳产品并履行企业社会责任,零售商负责销售,政府对制造商进行研发补贴,采用Stackelberg博弈的方法分别探讨集中决策以及分散决策下供应链各方决策以及利润情况,并分析企业社会责任水平以及政府补贴对低碳供应链决策的影响。研究结果表明,随着制造商履行社会责任水平的提高,制造商的碳减排水平越来越高;制造商利润增加而零售商利润降低;政府对制造商进行研发补贴后,在一定范围内可以降低双重边际效应,且存在最优政府研发补贴系数,使供应链整体利润最大。In the low-carbon supply chain,manufacturers produced low-carbon products and fulfill corporate social responsibility(CSR),retailers were responsible for sales,the government subsidized manufacturers for R&D.The method of Stackelberg game was adopted to discuss the decision-making and profits of all parties in the supply chain under centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making respectively.Then the impact of CSR level and government subsidies on low-carbon supply chain decision-making was analyzed.The results show that the level of carbon emission reduction of manufacturers is increasing with the improvement of manufacturers′CSR.The manufacturer′s profit increases while the retailer′s profit decreases.After the government subsidizes the R&D of manufacturers,the double marginal effect can be reduced within a certain range,and there is an optimal government R&D subsidy coefficient that maximizes the overall profit of the supply chain.

关 键 词：低碳供应链 企业社会责任 政府补贴 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F202[经济管理—国民经济]