环保官员异地交流对企业环境绩效的影响研究  

Research on the Influence of Environmental Officials’Cross-Location Exchanges on Corporate Environmental Performance

作　　者：于连超 莫彬 季培楠 YU Lianchao;MO Bin;JI Peinan(Lanzhou University,Lanzhou,China;Tianjin University,Tianjin,China)

机构地区：[1]兰州大学管理学院,兰州市730000 [2]天津大学管理与经济学部

出　　处：《管理学报》2025年第3期536-545,共10页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助青年科学基金项目(72201117,72302111)。

摘　　要：运用沪深A股上市公司2011~2021年的经验证据,探讨环保官员异地交流对企业环境绩效的影响。研究发现,环保官员异地交流能够提升任职地区的企业环境绩效,且这种提升作用随着时间的推移而不断增强。对影响机制的分析发现,环保官员异地交流提升企业环境绩效的机制在于企业绿色创新这种长期方式,而非企业环保投资这种短期方式;且企业绿色创新机制表现为企业绿色发明创新明显提高,企业绿色其他创新提高不显著。对内外环境的分析发现,当金融制度较好、市场竞争激烈以及内部控制较好时,环保官员异地交流更能提升企业环境绩效。This study examines the impact of environmental officials’cross-location exchanges on corporate environmental performance,using empirical evidence from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2021.The results show that the cross-location exchanges of environmental officials enhance the environmental performance of firms in the region where they work,and this enhancement increases over time.The analysis of the influence mechanism reveals that the mechanism of the cross-location exchanges of environmental officials to improve corporate environmental performance lies in the long-term way of corporate green innovation,but not in the short-term way of corporate environmental investment.Moreover,the mechanism of corporate green innovation shows that corporate green invention innovations are significantly improved,while other corporate green innovations are not.The analysis of internal and external environments shows that when the financial system is better,the market is more competitive,and internal controls are better,the cross-location exchanges of environmental officials are more likely to enhance corporate environmental performance.

关 键 词：环保官员异地交流 环境绩效 金融制度 市场竞争 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]