滥用市场支配地位的行为性救济机制研究——理论分析与平台经济领域执法实践比较  

Research on the Behavioral Remedies for Abusing Market Dominance:Theoretical Analysis and Comparison of Enforcement Practices in the Platform Economy

作　　者：白让让[1] 王晨雨 BAI Rangrang;WANG Chenyu(School of Management,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经问题研究》2025年第4期55-69,共15页Research On Financial and Economic Issues

基　　金：复旦大学人文社会科学先锋计划“我国经营者集中的反垄断审查与执法者的行为性救济偏好分析——兼论专利密集领域的执法困境”(2021‒16)。

摘　　要：在结构性救济面临诸多立法难题和实施障碍的背景下,美国、欧盟、中国等国家或地区的反垄断执法机构将行为性救济作为规制平台运营商滥用市场支配地位的主要工具,并取得了一定的成效。本文以具体的执法案例为研究背景,将一般意义上的行为性救济解构为执法者与垄断者之间的机制设计问题,并给出了三种行为性救济模式静态均衡的若干条件。本文选取美国微软IE浏览器垄断案、欧盟微软播放器垄断案、中国阿里巴巴集团“二选一”垄断案作为行为性救济模式的代表性案例,从核心内容、实施进程、模式创新和执法成效等方面进行比较研究。结合平台经济领域行为性救济模式的实施障碍,本文提出了优化行为性救济模式的具体思路。Since 2020,antitrust agencies in the US,the EU,and China,among other countries or regions,have initiated antitrust administrative investigations or judicial proceedings against anticompetitive behaviors of platform operators,such as Amazon,Microsoft,Alibaba,and Meituan.Against the backdrop of the large net loss of social efficiency of structural remedies and the challenges of information asymmetry,moral hazard,and insufficient enforcement resources faced by conventional behavioral remedies,these antitrust legislatures and enforcement agencies are designing and launching new ways of incentivizing and restraining such as self-reporting and antitrust compliance,some of those have achieved certain enforcement results in curbing monopoly power and promoting industrial innovation.This paper explains behavioral remedies as a process of mechanism design and implementation based on a principal-agent relationship.The antitrust administrative enforcement agency is the designer or principal of the rules and objectives of behavioral remedies,while the monopoly enterprises are the implementers of the remedies.Combining the anti-monopoly enforcement practices in the US,the EU,and China,this paper classifies three basic types of behavioral remedies,namely,no commitment by enterprises,self-commitment by monopoly operators,and enforcement by regulators.This paper chooses the US Microsoft Internet Explorer monopoly case,the EU Microsoft Media Player monopoly case,and China Alibaba Group“choose one out of two”monopoly case as representative cases,and analyzes their differences in the evaluation of competitive harm,the progress of implementation,and the effects of enforcement.To enhance the effectiveness of behavioral remedies in China’s antimonopoly field,it is necessary to promote the reform and improvement of the existing legislation and enforcement system in the following three aspects.First,taking the new revision of the Anti‑Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China as an opportunity,we should continue to supplem

关 键 词：平台经济 滥用市场支配地位 行为性救济 反垄断 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]