检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:于长革 Yu Changge
机构地区:[1]中国财政科学研究院
出 处:《财政科学》2025年第1期129-138,共10页Fiscal Science
摘 要:本文基于我国1994年分税制改革的背景、目标和分权策略,在系统分析分税制改革以来中央对地方转移支付制度演进逻辑的基础上,深入探讨转移支付在促进地方财政经济发展、做大收入“蛋糕”、控制财政支出规模等方面的激励约束不足问题及其根源,并提出了具体的优化思路和政策建议,重点包括以下两个层次:首先,中央上收一部分事权和支出责任,调降转移支付规模至合理区间;其次,通过设立专门的效率激励性转移支付、优化分配办法、加强预算监管和审计等途径健全激励约束机制,消除转移支付效率损失。Based on the background,objectives and decentralization strategies of China's tax-sharing reform in 1994,this paper systematically analyzes the evolution logic of the central government's transfer payment to local governments since the tax-sharing system reform.It then delves into the insufficient incentive and constraint issues of transfer payment in promoting local fiscal and economic development and controlling the scale of fiscal expenditures,as well as their root causes.The paper also proposes specific optimization ideas and policy recommendations,focusing on two levels:Firstly,the central government should reclaim some of the powers and expenditure responsibilities,and accordingly reduce the scale of transfer payment to a reasonable range.Secondly,it should improve the incentive and constraint mechanism through establishing specialized efficiency-incentive transfer payment,optimizing the allocation methods,and strengthening budget supervision and auditing,aiming to eliminate the efficiency loss of transfer payment.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.147