国有企业改革深化提升行动背景下专职外部董事管理现状、困境及优化策略——以G企业为例  

Current Situation,Dilemma and Optimization Strategies of Full-time ExternalDirector Management under Background of Deepening and Upgrading Reform of State-owned Enterprises—Taking Enterprise G as Example

作　　者：陈自立 Chen Zili

机构地区：[1]中国华能集团香港有限公司(华能国际电力开发公司)人力资源部,中国香港

出　　处：《中国人事科学》2025年第3期73-80,共8页Chinese Personnel Science

基　　金：2022年度电力行业人才研究课题“国有企业专职外部董事管理创新机制及优化路径研究”的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：国有企业改革深化提升行动中,专职外部董事为完善国有企业公司治理发挥了重要的作用。对G企业问卷调查结果的分析显示,国有企业专职外部董事目前还存在董事会有“形”无“实”现象,导致专职外部董事面临职权难以做实、年龄老化、来源单一、“双重身份”、能力胜任及考核薪酬激励不完善问题。为进一步优化国有企业专职外部董事管理,应保障董事会职权和董事权责落实到位,拓宽专职外部董事来源渠道,提升专职外部董事履职能力,加大专职外部董事考核激励约束力度以及加强专职外部董事履职支撑保障。In the deepening and upgrading action of state-owned enterprise reform,full-time external directors have played an important role in improving the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises.The analysis of the questionnaire survey results of Enterprise G shows that there is still a phenomenon that there is‘form’but no‘reality’in the board of directors of state-owned enterprises,which leads to difficulties in fulfilling the duties of full-time external directors,aging,single source,“dual identity”,and problems in competence and assessment salary incentives.To further optimize the management of full-time external directors in state-owned enterprises,it is necessary to ensure that the powers and responsibilities of the board of directors and directors are fully implemented,broaden the sources of full-time external directors,enhance their ability to perform their duties,increase the assessment and incentive constraint of full-time external directors,and strengthen the support and guarantee for their performance.

关 键 词：专职外部董事 公司治理 激励约束 国有企业改革 

分 类 号：D6[政治法律—政治学] C93[政治法律—中外政治制度]