新《公司法》框架下双层股权制度的体系化适用——以降低控制权总成本为视角  

Systematic Application of the Dual-Class Share Structure in the New Company Law-From the Perspective of Reducing the Total Cost of Control

作　　者：徐海燕 王一天 XU Haiyan;WANG Yitian

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学法学院

出　　处：《经贸法律评论》2025年第2期39-59,共21页Business and Economic Law Review

摘　　要：作为《公司法》增设的新制度,双层股权制度面临信义义务单一、解除规则缺位、加权规则错配的多重适用困境。基于双股结构的特殊性,双股制度适用不可囿于传统代理成本理论的单向视角,而陷入认识误区。双股制度的具体适用应以控制权总成本为理论视角予以体系化展开。具言之,双股制度须全面考虑高表决权股东兼具管理者与股东身份的特殊治理需求,应以分层化信义义务控制代理冲突成本;须重视代理能力成本的阻抑,应以复合型解除条款对其进行动态调整;须审慎平衡被代理人成本,应以加权规则限缩适用与鼓励倾斜保护机制“向上竞逐”并行。As a newly introduced institution in the Company Law,the dual-class share structure confronts multiple application dilemmas,including the uniformity of fiduciary duties,the absence of rescission rules,and the misalignment of weighting regulations.Given the unique characteristics of the dual-class structure,its application cannot be confined to the one-dimensional perspective of traditional agency cost theory,which may lead to cognitive misconceptions.Instead,the specific application of the dual-class system should be systematically developed from the theoretical perspective of the overall cost of control.Specifically,this system must comprehensively consider the special governance needs of high-voting shareholders who concurrently hold the roles of managers and shareholders,employing stratified fiduciary duties to manage agency conflict costs.It must also prioritize mitigating the costs associated with agency capabilities,dynamically adjusting through composite rescission clauses.Furthermore,it is crucial to carefully balance the costs borne by principals,concurrently employing weighting rules to narrow application scope while encouraging an“upward competition”in favor of protective mechanisms with preferential tilt.

关 键 词：双层股权结构 控制权总成本 代理成本 被代理人成本 信义义务 

分 类 号：D922.291.91[政治法律—经济法学]