政府奖惩下家庭废弃药品回收演化博弈研究  

Research on the Evolutionary Game of Household Pharmaceutical Waste Recycling Under Government Rewards and Punishment

作　　者：杨倩[1] 刘长义[1] 刘志[1] 刘从虎 YANG Qian;LIU Changyi;LIU Zhi;LIU Conghu(School of Economics and Management,Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu 241000,China;School of Mechanical and Electronic Engineering,Suzhou University,Suzhou 234000,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽工程大学经济与管理学院,安徽芜湖241000 [2]宿州学院机械与电子工程学院,安徽宿州234000

出　　处：《宿州学院学报》2025年第2期39-43,共5页Journal of Suzhou University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071002,71901002);国家社会科学基金一般项目(23BGL136)。

摘　　要：本研究旨在探讨家庭废弃药品回收过程中政府与不同回收渠道之间的动态演化关系。为此,构建了一个涵盖政府、正规渠道及非正规渠道的三方演化博弈模型,旨在分析各参与主体在家庭废弃药品回收中的行为策略选择,并进一步分析政府奖惩措施对回收渠道行为策略选择的影响。研究结果显示,在家庭废弃药品回收过程中,各参与主体的行为策略选择不仅受自身内部因素的制约,还会受到其他参与主体的影响。此外,政府对正规渠道的奖惩力度与其积极回收的概率呈正相关,而对非正规渠道的惩罚强度则与其不参与回收的概率呈正相关。This study aims to explore the dynamic evolutionary relationship between the government and different recycling channels in the recycling of household pharmaceutical waste.To this end,a tripartite evolutionary game mo-del involving the government,formal channels,and informal channels is constructed.It analyzes the behavioral stra-tegy choices of each participant in recycling household pharmaceutical waste and examines the impact of government rewards and punishment on behavioral strategy choices of recycling channels.The results show that in the recycling process,the behavioral strategy choices of each participant are not only constrained by their internal factors but also significantly influenced by the behavioral strategy choices of other participants.Furthermore,the government′s rewards and punishment for formal channels positively correlate with their probability of actively recycling,while the punishment intensity for informal channels positively correlates with their probability of not participating in recycling.

关 键 词：家庭废弃药品 三方演化博弈模型 政府奖惩机制 回收渠道 

分 类 号：F721[经济管理—产业经济]