结构性货币政策与商业银行风险承担  

Structural Monetary Policy and Commercial Bank Risk-Taking

作　　者：王朝阳[1] 孙梦阳 WANG Chao-yang;SUN Meng-yang

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院,北京102400 [2]中国社会科学院大学(研究生院)应用经济学院,北京102400

出　　处：《现代金融研究》2025年第4期3-19,共17页Journal of modern finance

基　　金：中国社会科学院大学(研究生院)研究生科研创新支持计划项目成果(2024KYS016)的资助。

摘　　要：本文基于2013-2022年我国124家商业银行的非平衡面板数据,研究结构性货币政策对银行风险承担的影响。研究结果表明:结构性货币政策力度加大会提高银行的风险承担水平,其中,直接定向性结构性货币政策调整工具对银行风险承担的影响在区域性商业银行和经济上行期时作用效果更显著。进一步研究发现,结构性货币政策力度加大通过加剧银行竞争来提升银行的风险承担水平,这一中介效应在再融资类结构性货币政策工具中存在,而在直接定向性调整工具中效果不显著;有效的监管约束能够在一定程度上抑制结构性货币政策下银行的过度风险承担。Based on unbalanced panel data from 124 Chinese commercial banks during 2013-2022,this study examines the impact of structural monetary policy on bank risk-taking.The results demonstrate that the intensification of structural monetary policy implementation increases bank risk-taking levels.Specifically,direct targeted structural monetary policy adjustment tools exhibit more pronounced effects on bank risk-taking among regional commercial banks and during economic upswings.Further research reveals that the intensified structural monetary policy elevates bank risk-taking by exacerbating interbank competition—this mediating effect is observable in refinancing-based structural monetary policy tools but insignificant in direct targeted adjustment tools.Additionally,effective regulatory constraints can partially mitigate excessive bank risk-taking induced by structural monetary policy.

关 键 词：结构性货币政策 银行风险承担 银行竞争 监管约束 

分 类 号：F822.0[经济管理—财政学]