政府引导基金的就业效应:基于融资约束和内外部监督视角  

Employment Effects of Government Guidance Funds:Perspectives from Financing Constraints and Internal and External Supervision

作　　者：陈晓宇 锁凌燕[2,3] 陈娟 CHEN Xiao-yu;SUO Ling-yan;CHEN Juan

机构地区：[1]清华大学五道口金融学院 [2]北京大学经济学院 [3]北京大学经济学院风险管理与保险学系 [4]中国人民银行金融研究所,北京100083

出　　处：《现代金融研究》2025年第4期39-52,共14页Journal of modern finance

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(22JJD790091)、中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金的资助。

摘　　要：本文以2014-2022年中国上市公司为样本,运用双重差分模型考察政府引导基金对企业就业水平的影响及作用机制。结果表明,政府引导基金能显著提升企业的就业规模、职工薪酬总额和劳动收入份额,带来就业市场的“规模效应”和“福利效应”。进一步研究发现,政府引导基金的就业效应具有短期非平衡性,对技术密集型行业和高端人才的促进效应更为明显。机制分析表明,政府引导基金通过缓解融资约束、提高国有持股比例和增强监督治理效应提高企业就业水平。本文认为,政府引导基金可以有效融合“政府引导”和“市场机制”的制度优势,为理解影响中国劳动力市场的因素提供了微观和宏观层面的新证据。This paper employs a difference-in-differences(DID)model with a sample of Chinese listed companies during 2014-2022 to examine the impact and mechanisms of government guidance funds on corporate employment levels.The results demonstrate that government guidance funds significantly increase corporate employment scale,total employee compensation and labor income share,generating both“scale effects”and“welfare effects”in the labor market.Further analysis reveals that the employment effects of government guidance funds exhibit short-term disequilibrium,with more pronounced promotional effects in technology-intensive industries and on high-end talent.Mechanism analysis indicates that government guidance funds improve corporate employment by alleviating financing constraints,increasing state-owned shareholding ratios,and strengthening supervisory governance effects.This research argues that government guidance funds effectively integrate the institutional advantages of“government guidance”and“market mechanisms”,providing new micro and macro-level evidence for understanding the factors affecting China’s labor market.

关 键 词：政府引导基金 就业优先战略 劳动收入份额 监督治理效应 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]