信息治理与国内冲突——基于信号博弈模型的实证检验  

How Information Governance Affects Domestic Conflicts? An Empirical Test Based on Signaling Game Model

作　　者：桂晓书 吕蕙伊 GUI Xiaoshu;LYU Huiyi(Chenghai Advanced Research Institute for Global Development and Security,Renmin University of China;Department of International Relations,Tsinghua University)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学澄海全球发展与安全高等研究院,北京100872 [2]清华大学社会科学学院国际关系学系,北京100084

出　　处：《世界经济与政治》2025年第3期63-93,151,152,共33页World Economics and Politics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“应用大数据技术预测全球突发重大危机事件引发的社会骚乱研究”(项目批准号:20CGJ015)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：随着数字技术的不断进步,关于其如何影响国家安全治理的研究日益增多。然而,对于为何有些政府的信息治理措施能有效缓解国内抗争与冲突,而另一些却适得其反,仍是一个有待充分讨论的问题。有别于聚焦于单一案例或特定类型国家的既有研究,作者从宏观层面探究信息治理措施影响国内冲突风险的内在机制,基于信息不对称的框架构建了一个信号博弈模型,旨在阐明政府如何战略性地运用信息治理措施向潜在挑战者发出威慑信号。该模型发现,成本考量与政府实力是决定治理效果的关键:成本的增加会降低政府实施信息治理措施的可能性;而在相同的治理成本下,随着政府实力的削弱,信息治理作为威慑信号的功效会大打折扣,难以有效塑造政府强大的形象,反而可能加剧国内抗争与冲突爆发的风险。运用2016—2020年的跨国月度面板数据对理论假说进行实证检验后发现,治理成本越高,政府采取信息治理措施的可能性越低。作为旨在抑制国内冲突的一种潜在手段,信息治理措施的有效性严格受限于政府实力的强大和政权的稳固性;而在政府实力较弱的国家,该措施非但不能遏制国内抗争与冲突,反而显著促进了此类事件的频发,这一负面效应在稳健性检验中依然保持显著。As digital technologies evolve rapidly,research on their impact on national security governance has increased. However,the mechanisms that explain why information governance measures effectively mitigate domestic conflicts and resistance in some states but backfire in others remain underexplored. Departing from existing studies that focus on single cases or specific regime types,this paper investigates the intrinsic dynamics of how information governance affects domestic conflict risks from a macro-level perspective. Building on the framework of information asymmetry,this research develops a signaling game to elucidate how governments strategically employ information governance measures to deter potential challengers. The model reveals that cost considerations and government capacity are key determinants of governance efficacy. Specifically,rising costs constrain governments' propensity to implement such governance measures. However,under the same governance costs,as government capacity weakens,the efficacy of information governance as a deterrent signal is significantly reduced,making it difficult to credibly project a strong government image and potentially exacerbating the risk of domestic contestation and conflict onset.Cross-national statistical analyses of monthly panel data from 2016 to 2020 robustly support these theoretical predictions. The statistical results show that higher governance costs are associated with a lower probability of adopting information governance measures. The effectiveness of information governance as a tool for suppressing domestic conflicts is strictly constrained by government capacity and regime stability. In countries with weaker government capacity,such measures not only fail to curb resistance and conflicts but also significantly contribute to the frequent occurrence of these events. This negative effect remains significant in robustness checks.

关 键 词：信息政治 国家治理 国内冲突 国家安全 信号博弈 

分 类 号：D815.5[政治法律—国际关系]