碳市场中的执法与企业合规行为:一项实验经济学研究  

Enforcement Mechanisms and Compliance Behavior in the Carbon Market:A Study of Experimental Economics

作　　者：罗俊 吴丽倩 陈叶烽[3] LUO Jun;WU Li-qian;CHEN Ye-feng(School of Economics,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics;Zhejiang Research Institute of ZUFE-UCASS,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics;School of Economics,Zhejiang University)

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学经济学院 [2]浙江财经大学—中国社会科学院大学浙江研究院 [3]浙江大学经济学院

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2025年第3期135-153,共19页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“数字化时代下个人慈善捐赠行为特征与激励机制的理论和实验研究”(批准号72473125);浙江省哲学社会科学规划重大课题“信息干预、认知偏差与劳动力市场匹配的实验研究”(批准号23QNYC14ZD)。

摘　　要：当前中国碳市场具有不完全监测的特征,配额收缴在很大程度上依赖企业的自我排放报告,可能导致碳市场无法取得预期效果。本文利用实验经济学方法模拟中国碳市场情景,在不完全监测环境中考察配额分配方式和执法机制对企业合规水平的影响。研究发现,配额分配方式和企业配额消耗异质性会对企业的合规行为产生影响。具体而言,相比基准线法的分配方式,企业在拍卖法下具有更频繁的违规行为,且高配额消耗企业相较于低配额消耗企业具有更高的违规水平。违规报告高惩罚机制和后续概率监测机制在两种分配方式下都能减少企业的违规行为,配额短缺高惩罚机制与历史报告审查机制仅在基准线法中有效。因此,在碳市场监管实践中,政府可以针对性执法,加大对高配额消耗企业的监督力度。在当前的基准线法背景下,可通过历史报告审查机制和后续概率监测机制提高执法效率。在执法力度的设置方面,政府应重视对违规报告行为的处罚,对配额短缺行为的惩处力度不必过高。本文为理解和认识中国碳市场中执法机制的有效性和针对性提供了政策启示。China's national emissions trading market plays an important role in reaching the goals of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality.China's carbon market has the feature of imperfect monitoring,which means that the government cannot obtain sufficient data to tell whether firms report honestly.This can lead to enforcement problems and affect the efficiency of carbon markets.China's national emissions trading market has problems such as the poor quality of emissions data and low carbon prices.This paper simulates the carbon markets in laboratory to study the impact of the initial quotas allocation mechanism and enforcement on compliance performance.There are two scenarios in the experiment:the auction scenario and the benchmarking scenario.Each scenario includes a control group and four mechanism intervention groups.The intervention mechanisms contain the reporting violation penalty mechanism,permit shortfall penalty mechanism,previous report audit mechanism,and subsequent probability monitoring mechanism.Empirical data may have the following shortcomings when used to study the enforcement mechanism and compliance behavior in the carbon market.Firstly,the compliance data of firms is private information and researchers cannot obtain sufficient data to tell whether firms report honestly under current technical and equipment conditions.Secondly,it is difficult to get enough data to study the relationship between enforcement mechanisms and compliance behavior.As China's carbon market adopts a unified law enforcement mechanism,there is no obvious difference in law enforcement mechanisms between local carbon pilot projects.Compared with empirical data,experimental data can identify the causal relationship between law enforcement mechanisms and compliance through mechanism designs.The results show that the initial allocation mechanism and the heterogeneity of quota consumption impact compliance choices.Firms tend to have higher violations in the auction scenario and firms with high quota consumption are more likely to be non-

关 键 词：碳市场 合规行为 执法 实验经济学 

分 类 号：F424[经济管理—产业经济]