知识可以无信念吗——回应席尔瓦对蕴涵论的挑战  

Can Knowledge Be Beliefless?A Criticism of Silva's Challenge to the Entailment Thesis

作　　者：张小星 Zhang Xiaoxing

机构地区：[1]云南大学政府管理学院哲学系

出　　处：《哲学研究》2025年第3期118-131,174,共15页Philosophical Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“实践知识的社会维度研究”(编号23BZX073)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：蕴涵论是知识论研究中长期默认的理论。根据蕴涵论,若某人知道一个命题,就必然相信这个命题。知识是满足特定认知条件的信念,而信念是知识的主要构成元素。近年来,许多学者对蕴涵论提出挑战;蕴涵论的辩护者也通过诉诸倾向信念与薄信念等概念进行回复。本文考察席尔瓦对蕴涵论的最新攻击,并指明这些攻击的不足。The entailment thesis,according to which knowledge entails belief,has been a prevalent position in epistemology.Recently,many epistemologists have challenged the entailment thesis.Champions of the thesis have replied by resorting to dispositional and thin beliefs.This paper examines Silva's recent attack at the entailment thesis.I argue that Silva's argument is unsuccessful.It is plausible to suggest that,in Silva's key scenarios,the protagonists who possess knowledge also have both thin and dispositional beliefs.

关 键 词：JTB理论 无信念知识 倾向信念 薄信念 概念论 

分 类 号：B017[哲学宗教—哲学理论]