双层股权结构:理论误区与破解方案  

Dual-Class Share Structures:Theoretical Misunderstandings and Solutions

作　　者：胡婷 HU Ting(Law School,Leiden University,Leiden,Netherlands 2311 EZ)

机构地区：[1]莱顿大学法学院,荷兰莱顿2311 EZ

出　　处：《温州大学学报(社会科学版)》2025年第2期112-124,共13页Journal of Wenzhou University:Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家留学基金管理委员会“国家建设高水平大学公派研究生项目”(〔2022〕792号)。

摘　　要：随着新《公司法》的实施,双层股权结构在我国资本市场的实践已迈入新阶段。实践应用揭示了理论预期与实际效果间的显著差异,这种现象源于对该结构潜在治理风险的理论误区及由此产生的制度惯性。因此,须调整当前严格的强制性企业治理监管模式,革新监管理念,逐步过渡到更加灵活和适应性强的监管方法。并结合立法调整与公司内部自治策略,以实现企业发展需求与股东权益保护之间的有效平衡。With the enactment of the new Company Law,the practice of dual-class share structures in China’s capital market has entered a new phase.However,practical applications have demonstrated notable disparities between theoretical projections and real-world outcomes.These discrepancies are primarily rooted in theoretical misunderstandings regarding the governance risks associated with such structures and the resulting institutional inertia.Therefore,it is necessary to adjust the current strict mandatory corporate governance regulatory model,renew the regulatory principles,and gradually transition towards a more flexible and adaptive regulatory approach.This adjustment should be accompanied by legislative modifications and internal corporate governance strategies to achieve a balance between the needs of corporate development and safeguarding shareholders’rights and interests effectively.

关 键 词：双层股权结构 投票权 控股股东 信息披露 

分 类 号：D922.291.92[政治法律—经济法学]