非行政处罚性监管与股票价格操纵——基于交易所年报问询函的实证证据  

Non-Administrative Punitive Regulation and Stock Price Manipulation——Empirical Evidence Based on Exchange Annual Report Interrogatories

作　　者：罗胜旭 吴崇林 刘杰 Luo Shengxu;Wu Chonglin;Liu Jie(College of Economics and Management,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,Fujian,China;China School of Banking and Finance,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100105,China)

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350002 [2]对外经济贸易大学中国金融学院,北京100105

出　　处：《金融发展研究》2025年第3期14-24,共11页Journal Of Financial Development Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“金融风险外溢视角下市场操纵的影响评估与治理路径研究”(23CJY025)。

摘　　要：本研究以交易所年报问询函为研究对象,实证分析了非行政处罚性监管对股票价格操纵的影响及其作用机制。研究结果表明,问询函监管通过减少投资者间的信息不对称有效抑制了股票价格操纵。尤其是在回复内容翔实且回复内容与问询函高度相关的情况下,监管效果更加显著。此外,在信息不确定性较高、公司治理水平较低的企业以及投资者情绪低迷的时期,问询函监管的遏制作用更强。研究丰富了非行政处罚性监管的经济后果研究,并为股票价格操纵的治理提供了新的视角。This study empirically analyzes the impact of non-administrative penalty regulation on stock price manipulation and its mechanism of action,using exchange annual report inquiry letters as the research object.The results of the study show that inquiry letter regulation effectively inhibits stock price manipulation by reducing information asymmetry among investors.In particular,the regulatory effect is more significant when the responses are detailed and highly relevant to the inquiry letter.In addition,the deterrent effect of inquiry letter regulation is stronger in firms with higher information uncertainty,lower levels of corporate governance,and during periods of low investor sentiment.The study enriches the research on the economic consequences of non-administrative punitive regulation and provides new perspectives on the governance of stock price manipulation.

关 键 词：公司治理 问询函监管 股票价格操纵 信息披露 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]