地方政府隐性债务治理与企业违约风险  

Governance of Local Government Implicit Debt and Enterprise Default Risk

作　　者：姚凤阁[1] 于佳怡 YAO Fengge;YU Jiayi(School of Finance,Harbin University of Commerce,Harbin 150028,China)

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨商业大学金融学院,哈尔滨150028

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版)》2025年第2期30-40,55,共12页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“加快形成新质生产力的政策体系和实现路径研究”(23&ZD069)。

摘　　要：随着经济转型深化,企业违约风险逐渐显化为系统性金融风险的关键风险源。本文利用地方政府隐性债务“穿透式”监管作为准自然实验,以2015—2022年中国A股上市公司作为研究样本,采用双重差分法检验地方政府隐性债务治理对企业违约风险的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,地方政府隐性债务治理——“穿透式”监管能够充分发挥治理效果,有效降低企业违约风险。机制检验表明,地方政府隐性债务治理能够通过缓解融资约束、减少杠杆操纵等方式降低企业违约风险。异质性分析表明,地方政府隐性债务治理在研发密集度高、企业业务关联多及地区金融发展水平低的企业中效果更为显著。In recent years,the issue of corporate default risk has increasingly become a trigger for various systemic risks.This article uses local government implicit debt penetration supervision as a quasi natural experiment,using A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2022 as research samples,and uses the double difference method to test the impact of local government implicit debt governance on corporate default risk.Research has found that local government implicit debt governance-“penetrating”regulation can fully exert governance effects,effectively reduce the risk of corporate default,and still hold true after a series of robustness tests.Mechanism testing shows that local government implicit debt governance can reduce corporate default risk by alleviating financing constraints and reducing leverage manipulation.Heterogeneity analysis shows that local government implicit debt governance is more effective in enterprises with high research and development intensity,multiple business connections,and low regional financial development levels.

关 键 词：地方政府隐性债务 “穿透式”监管 企业违约风险 融资约束 杠杆操纵 

分 类 号：F322[经济管理—产业经济]