环境信用监管下相关主体策略行为的随机演化分析  

Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis for Strategic Behaviors of Related Subjects Under Environmental Credit Supervision

作　　者：陈伟杰[1] 汤玉秀 张涛 CHEN Weijie;TANG Yuxiu;ZHANG Tao(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Normal University,Chongqing 401331,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆师范大学经济与管理学院,重庆401331

出　　处：《复杂系统与复杂性科学》2025年第1期113-122,共10页Complex Systems and Complexity Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71901044)。

摘　　要：为了探究环境信用联合奖惩背景下相关主体策略行为的影响因素,考虑公众环境关注度,构建地方政府、第三方治理企业及排污企业的三方随机演化博弈模型,通过借鉴It^o随机微分方程理论分析了三方主体的行为策略的稳定性,并结合数值仿真方法对博弈主体策略演化进行研究。研究发现:第三方治理企业选择积极治污策略会带动排污企业选择环保守信策略,二者之间的策略选择存在相互影响;公众环境关注度对三方主体策略收敛均有促进作用,对于地方政府的策略选择,上级政府的处罚力度具有决定作用;奖惩分配系数对第三方治理企业与排污企业策略收敛具有方向性差异,且奖励的激励作用更显著。In order to explore the influencing factors of related subjects'strategic behavior under the background of joint reward and punishment of environmental credit,and considering public environmental attention,a three-party stochastic evolutionary game model of local government,third-party governance enterprise and polluting enterprise is constructed.The It^o stochastic differential equation theory is used to analyze the conditions of game subject behavior stability while numerical simulation method is used to investigate the strategic evolution of the game subject.The results show that the positive pollution control strategy of third-party governance enterprise will drive polluting enterprise to choose environmental protection and trustworthy strategy,and their strategy choice will influence each other.Public environmental attention has promoting effect to the tripartite game subject strategy convergence.For the strategy of local government,the government at a higher level of penalties is of decisive role for its strategy choice.Rewards and punishments distribution ratio has the directional difference to third party governance and pollution enterprise strategy convergence,and reward incentive is more significant.

关 键 词：环境信用 公众环境关注度 环境污染第三方治理 随机演化博弈 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学] X505[环境科学与工程—环境工程]