碳金融驱动企业绿色创新的策略分析——基于政府干预的演化博弈视角  

Strategic Analysis of Carbon Finance Driving Corporate Green Innovation--An Evolutionary Game Perspective Based on Government Intervention

作　　者：郑成涛 周叶[1] ZHENG Chengtao;ZHOU Ye(School of Economics and Management,Nanchang Hangkong University,Nanchang,330063,China)

机构地区：[1]南昌航空大学经济管理学院,南昌330063

出　　处：《南昌航空大学学报(社会科学版)》2025年第1期107-116,共10页Journal of Nanchang Hangkong University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：2022年国家自然科学基金“碳规制下冷链物流企业绿色创新的行为机理与政策优化研究”(72263023);2023年南昌航空大学研究生创新专项资金项目“政府碳金融驱动制造业绿色创新的行为机制研究”(YC2023-071)。

摘　　要：随着我国金融市场的完善,碳金融政策可以有效地解决高污染、高排放企业绿色创新融资难的问题。以政府、银行和企业为对象构建演化博弈模型,以便研究政府监管下碳金融促进企业绿色创新的合理策略。结果表明,政府通过合理的奖惩及税收方式可以使银行与企业快速提升合作的意愿;当绿色创新带来的收益达到一定阈值时,企业骗贷的概率变小,政府趋于宽监管,银行的坏账率变低,三方整体的收益增加。研究结论可以为政府碳金融助力企业绿色创新提供一些决策参考。With the continuous improvement of China’s financial market,carbon financial policies can effectively address the financing difficulties of high-pollution and high-emission enterprises in green innovation.This study constructs an evolutionary game model involving government,banks,and enterprises to explore reasonable strategies for carbon finance to promote corporate green innovation under government supervision.The results indicate that through reasonable incentive and penalty mechanisms along with taxation measures,the government can rapidly enhance cooperative willingness between banks and enterprises.When the benefits from green innovation reach a certain threshold,enterprises show reduced probability of loan fraud,governments tend to adopt lenient supervision,banks experience lower non-performing loan ratios,and all three parties achieve increased overall benefits.The research conclusions provide decision-making references for governments to utilize carbon finance in facilitating corporate green innovation.

关 键 词：政府监管 碳金融 绿色创新 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F8[经济管理]