认真对待法律解释的怀疑论——为法律解释的理性而辩  

Taking Skepticism Towards Legal Interpretation Seriously——To Argue for the Rationality of Legal Interpretation

作　　者：宋旭光[1] Song Xuguang

机构地区：[1]深圳大学法学院

出　　处：《法学》2025年第3期14-26,共13页Law Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“系统论视野下的数字法治基本问题研究”(项目号:22&ZD201);深圳大学高水平大学三期建设重大专题(项目号:24ZDZT07)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：怀疑论的批判指向法律解释的必要性、理性、自主性、可行性等方面。认真对待法律解释的怀疑论,首先要认识到,怀疑论的根源在于它试图以理想主义尺度衡量和评价解释的现实功用,并因此得出法律解释“不能”的结论。其次要看到,怀疑论正确指出了法律的弹性等诸多问题,但它的许多批判并不妥当,例如,将形式主义模型当作解释理论的典范予以批判,以特殊案件的“不能”证伪整个解释理论的可能,从解释行为的策略性得出规范思维的无用性。总之,要反驳其错误,回答其问题,吸收其正确观点,并为法律解释的理性辩护。法律解释是一种给予和索取理由的动态推论实践,解释的理性是由相关规范性制度框架内的所有参与者通过说理活动共同保障的。Sceptical critiques of legal interpretation are multiple and may point to the necessity, rationality, autonomy or feasibility of legal interpretation. To take skepticism seriously, it is first necessary to recognize that its root lies in its attempt to measure and evaluate the practical utility of legal interpretation on an idealistic scale, and thereby concludes that legal interpretation “cannot”. Secondly, it should be noted that while skepticism correctly points out many issues such as the flexibility of the law, many of its criticisms are inappropriate, such as criticizing the formalist model as the paradigm of interpretation theory, using the “canno” of special cases to disprove the entire interpretation theory, and concluding the uselessness of normative thinking from the strategic nature of interpretive behavior. In summary, it is necessary to refute its errors, answer its questions, absorb its correct viewpoints, and defend the the rationality of legal interpretation. Legal interpretation is essentially a dynamic inference practice of giving and asking for reasons, and its rationality is shaped by the reasoning of all participants within the relevant normative institutional framework.

关 键 词：法律解释 法律解释怀疑论 法律解释的理性 

分 类 号：D90[政治法律—法学理论]