不同资格审查方式下招投标主体合谋行为的演化博弈与仿真  

Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Colluding Behavior of Bidding and Tendering Subjects under Different Qualification Examination Methods

作　　者：董鸣皋[1] 王一木 DONG Minggao;WANG Yimu(School of Civil Engineering,Xi'an Shiyou University,Xi'an,Shaanxi 710065,China;School of Economics and Management,Xi'an Shiyou University,Xi'an,Shaanxi 710065,China)

机构地区：[1]西安石油大学土木工程学院,陕西西安710065 [2]西安石油大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710065

出　　处：《西安石油大学学报(社会科学版)》2025年第2期63-68,共6页Journal of Xi’an Shiyou University:Social Science Edition

基　　金：陕西省哲学社会科学研究专项“基于生态系统服务的陕西省生态空间功能评价与布局优化”(2022HZ1820);西安市科技计划项目“西安市能源行业碳排放预测及达峰路径优化研究”(23RKYJ0018);西安石油大学研究生教育教学改革研究项目“学科评估导向下管科硕士研究生培养质量周期性自评估与提升机制研究”(2021-X-YJG-016)。

摘　　要：为探究不同资格审查方式下招标人和投标人关于合谋行为的选择机制,基于演化博弈理论构建了招标与投标主体之间的演化博弈模型,分析了博弈双方合谋策略的选择机制、演化稳定性和影响因素,并利用MATLAB对博弈双方的动态演化过程和参数调整影响双方策略选择的过程进行仿真。研究结果表明,博弈双方的策略稳定性与双方合作的协同收益和采用资格后审下招标人的招标成本负相关,与资格预审下投标人的合谋成本、招标人的招标成本以及招标人收益分配的比例正相关。建议减少博弈双方的协同收益和资格后审下招标人的招标成本,增加投标人资格预审的合谋成本和资格预审下的招标成本,以有效遏制招投标合谋行为。In order to explore the selection mechanism of collusion behavior of tenderers and bidders under different qualification review methods,this paper constructed an evolutionary game model between the subjects of bidding and tendering based on evolutionary game theory,and analyzed the selection mechanism,evolutionary stability and influencing factors of the colluding strategies of the two players.MATLAB was also used to simulate the dynamic evolution process of both sides and the process of parameter adjustment affecting the strategy selection of both sides.The results show that the stability of both sides in the game is negatively correlated with the cooperative benefits of the two parties and the bidding cost of the tendering under the post-qualification examination,and positively correlated with the collusion cost of bidders,the bidding cost of tenderers and the proportion of income distribution of tenderers under prequalification.It is suggested to reduce the synergistic benefits of the two parties and the bidding cost of the tenderer under the post-qualification examination,increase the collusion cost of the bidder under the pre-qualification examination and the bidding cost under the pre-qualification examination,in order to effectively curb bidding collusion behavior.

关 键 词：资格审查 演化博弈 仿真分析 工程招投标 招投标合谋 

分 类 号：TU723.3[建筑科学—建筑技术科学] F284[经济管理—国民经济]