政府养老服务监管的演化动态:最有效机制的仿真研究  

A Simulation Study of the Most Effective Mechanism on Evolutionary Dynamics of Government Supervision for Elderly Care Services

作　　者：谢虔 孙涛[1] Xie Qian(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing,P.R.China)

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016 [2]江苏经贸职业技术学院数字商务学院

出　　处：《中国卫生事业管理》2025年第3期241-249,327,共10页Chinese Health Service Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“长三角区域一体化发展中环境污染协同治理机制及支持政策研究”(19BJL035);2021年江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究立项课题“江苏深度老龄化背景下家庭养老功能重塑及支持体系研究”(2021SJA0705)。

摘　　要：目的:研究政府养老服务监管和民间资本投资行为的交互决策行为及其动态演变规律,为政府科学制定奖惩政策进而顺利引导民间资本投资老龄产业提供理论依据。方法:基于四种不同的奖惩政策,本文构建了政府养老服务监管和民间资本投资行为的演化博弈模型,并结合Matlab软件进行实验仿真,重点讨论了演化稳定策略是否存在,以及混合策略纳什均衡作为系统ESS的可能性。理论研究与仿真结果均证实:1)政府实施静态惩罚政策时系统不存在ESS,而实施动态惩罚政策时系统或将存在ESS,并且系统ESS只能是MSNE;2)动态惩罚和静态补贴政策下,MSNE只要存在就一定是系统ESS,但动态惩罚和动态补贴政策下,当MSNE存在且惩罚上限大于补贴上限时,MSNE才是系统ESS。结论:政府实施动态惩罚和静态补贴政策最优,并且应着重提高惩罚强度,此举既能引导民间资本投资老龄产业,又能降低理想均衡对政府严格监管的较高要求,进而避免高昂的监管成本支出。Objective To study the interactive decision-making behavior and dynamic evolution law of government supervision of pension services and private capital investment behavior,and provide theoretical basis for the government to scientifically formulate reward and punishment policies and smoothly guide private capital to invest in pension care industry.Methods Based on four different reward and punishment policies,an evolutionary game model of government elderly care service supervision and private capital investment behavior was constructed.And combined with experimental simulation by Matlab software,the existence of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy(ESS)and the possibility of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium(MSNE)as the system ESS were discussed.Results Under the dynamic punishment and static subsidy policies,MSNE must be the system ESS as long as it exists,but under the dynamic punishment and dynamic subsidy policies,when MSNE exists and the punishment's upper limit is greater than the subsidy upper limit,MSNE is the system ESS.Conclusion It is optimal for the government to implement dynamic punishment and static subsidy policies,and focus on increasing the punishment intensity,which can not only guide private capital to invest in aging industries,but also reduce the higher requirements of ideal equilibrium for strict government supervision,thus avoiding high supervision costs.

关 键 词：老龄产业 奖惩政策 民间资本 监管博弈 

分 类 号：R19[医药卫生—卫生事业管理] D632.1[医药卫生—公共卫生与预防医学]