中国合作金融组织剩余控制权模式:从“两权分离”到“两权匹配”  

The Mode of Residual Control Rights in China’s Cooperative Financial Organizations:From“Separation of Two Rights”to“Matching of Two Rights”

作　　者：杨梦瑶 刘西川 YANG Mengyao;LIU Xichuan

机构地区：[1]华中农业大学经济管理学院,武汉430070

出　　处：《农业经济问题》2025年第4期14-30,共17页Issues in Agricultural Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“脱贫地区乡村振兴金融服务模式多元联结协同创新研究”(编号:22BGL066);华中农业大学高层次人才启动费项目“加快建设中国特色农业金融市场体系研究”(编号:108/11042010017);2023年度华中农业大学自主科技创新基金项目“持续推进脱贫地区乡村振兴的金融支持研究”(编号:2662023JGPY001)。

摘　　要：中国合作金融组织在同时实现对大股东的激励与约束以及小股东的利益保护方面面临挑战,这已成为合作金融组织发展停滞的关键原因之一。中国合作金融组织剩余控制权安排有“两权分离”与“两权匹配”两种思路:(1)从“两权分离”思路来看,中国合作金融组织存在同质型两权分离、失衡型两权分离和利疏型两权分离三种模式。这三种模式中的现金流权均无法表征大股东实际的风险承担意愿、能力与贡献,这也加剧了大小股东之间的利益冲突。(2)从“两权匹配”思路来看,本文将SY资金互助社归纳为“两权匹配型”剩余控制权模式。与既有三种模式不同,该模式通过股权补充机制、风控平衡机制、收益细化机制在剩余控制权制度安排的各个阶段补充大股东的现金流权,使现金流权可以更好地匹配大股东的风险承担意愿、能力与贡献,从根源上解决大小股东利益冲突问题。通过对这两种思路与四种模式的比较、评价,本文认为“两权匹配”思路和两权匹配型剩余控制权模式是中国合作金融组织剩余控制权制度安排的发展方向。为此,本文从制度基石等三个方面提出了政策建议。It is challenging for Chinese cooperative financial organizations to concurrently establish incentives and constraints for major shareholders while safeguarding the interests of minority shareholders.This is a critical factor to the current stagnation of cooperative financial organizations.There are two primary methods of allocating residual control in Chinese cooperative financial organizations:“separation of two rights”and“matching of two rights”:(1)From the perspective of“separation of two rights”,there are three models of cooperative financial organizations in China:homogeneous separation of powers,imbalanced separation of powers,and sparse separation of powers.However,the cash flow rights in these three models do not accurately reflect the actual risk-taking willingness,ability,and contribution of major shareholders.This discrepancy exacerbates the conflict of interests between large and small shareholders.(2)From the perspective of“matching of two rights”,this paper presents a summary of the model represented by SY Mutual Funds as a two-rights-matching residual control model.In contrast to the existing three models,this model incorporates the cash flow right of the major shareholder at each stage of the residual control right institutional arrangement through three mechanisms:an equity supplementation mechanism,a wind control balance mechanism,and an income refinement mechanism.This enables the cash flow right more closely align with the major shareholder's willingness to assume risks,capabilities,and contributions,while also addressing the inherent conflict of interest between major and minor shareholders.By undertaking a comparative and evaluative analysis of the two ideas and four models,this paper posits that the concept of“matching the two rights”and the model of residual control of matching the two rights represent a potential trajectory for the evolution of the institutional framework governing China's residual control of cooperative finance.In light of this,this paper proposes sp

关 键 词：合作金融组织 两权分离 两权匹配 剩余控制权 现金流权 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学]