维权成本分担下大数据杀熟治理的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Big Data Killing Governance under Sharing of Rights Defense Costs

作　　者：熊浩 张晨 鄢慧丽 徐宇淼 XIONG Hao;ZHANG Chen;YAN Huili;XU Yumiao(International Business School,Hainan University,Haikou 570100,China;College of International Tourism and Public Administration,Hainan University,Haikou 570100,China)

机构地区：[1]海南大学国际商学院,海南海口570100 [2]海南大学国际旅游与公共管理学院,海南海口570100

出　　处：《湖南大学学报(自然科学版)》2025年第4期159-169,共11页Journal of Hunan University:Natural Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71761009,72061010);海南省自然科学基金高层次人才项目(720RC570,722RC646);海南省研究生创新研究项目(Qhyb2022-20,Qhyb2021-19)。

摘　　要：研究聚焦政府监管与消费者维权作用下电商平台大数据杀熟治理问题,引入维权成本分担机制和惩罚性赔偿,构建政府-电商平台-消费者三方演化博弈模型,探究电商平台大数据杀熟有效抑制因素.研究表明:1)电商平台不会放弃大数据杀熟;2)提高监管成功率,加大政府处罚力度,提高惩罚性赔偿系数、维权率和维权成功率能有效抑制大数据杀熟;3)分担维权成本并不能有效抑制电商平台大数据杀熟.This study focuses on the governance problem of e-commerce platform big data killing under the role of government regulation and consumer rights defense,introduces the rights defense cost sharing mechanism and punitive damages,constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government-e-commerce platform-consumers,and explores the factors of effective inhibition of big data killing on e-commerce platforms.The study shows that 1)e-commerce platforms will not give up big data killing;2)improving the success rate of regulation,increasing government punishment,and improving the coefficient of punitive compensation,the rate of rights defense and the success rate of rights defense can effectively inhibit big data killing;3)sharing the cost of rights defense cannot effectively inhibit e-commerce platforms big data killing.

关 键 词：大数据杀熟 演化博弈 成本分担 惩罚性赔偿 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学] F2