模因、心灵与规范性  

Memes,Mind,and Normativity

作　　者：郑宇健 ZHENG Yujian

机构地区：[1]深圳大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学分析》2025年第2期106-116,198,共12页Philosophical Analysis

摘　　要：著名模因论者如丹尼特和布莱克莫尔曾提出比道金斯最初的提案更为激进的主张,由此引发了关于整个模因学方案的理论意义及其局限或缺陷的日益激烈的辩论。这些激进主张包括我们既是基因机器也是模因机器、机器内部不存在有意识的自我、复杂的复制子和环境的相互作用是生命的全部等观点。通过仔细审视凯特·迪斯廷对这些观点进行深入辨析时提出的一些关键论点,并对其加以批判,有望证成一种关于深层规范性的立场。Prominent memeticists such as Dennett and Blackmore have put forward claims more radical than Dawkins’original proposal,sparking an increasingly intense debate about the theoretical significance of the entire memetics program,as well as its limitations or flaws.These radical assertions include the ideas that we are both gene machines and meme machines,that there is no conscious self within the machine,and that the complex interplay of replicators and their environment constitutes the entirety of life.By closely examining and critiquing some of the key arguments raised by Kate Distin in her in-depth analysis of these views,it may be possible to substantiate a position concerning deep normativity.

关 键 词：文化基因 模因 心灵 规范性 

分 类 号：B80[哲学宗教—思维科学]