财政激励、环境监管与企业环境绩效  

Financial Incentives,Environmental Regulation and Corporate Environmental Performance

作　　者：罗建 刘锋 郑铿城 LUO Jian;LIU Feng;ZHENG Kengcheng(School of Finance and Taxation,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan Hubei 430073,China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学财政税务学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《生态经济》2025年第5期193-202,共10页Ecological Economy

基　　金：甘肃省科技计划项目“甘肃省财政教育支出对经济高质量发展的影响及溢出效应研究”(23JRZA440)。

摘　　要：财政激励影响着地方政府与企业之间的关系,论文试图从财政激励的角度来解释地方政府的环境监管如何受到财政压力影响,进而影响到辖区企业的环境绩效。以中国农业税改革为准自然实验,基于中国污染企业年度环境调查数据库实证检验了地方政府财政压力变化所带来的环境后果。研究发现,地方政府财政压力上升会带来辖区企业污染排放量增加,这主要是地方政府在环境保护与财政收入之间权衡的结果,财政压力上升会导致地方政府放松环境监管;财力缺口越大的区县,由财政压力所转化的污染激励效应越明显,也进一步表现为强税收征管与弱环境监管之间的替代,一系列稳健性检验也表明了结论的可靠性。有鉴于此,适当的纵向财政补偿机制设计和有效的环境目标约束对于弱化地方政府在环境保护上的策略性机会主义倾向具有重要的启示意义。Financial incentives affect the relationship between local governments and enterprises.This paper attempts to explain how the environmental supervision of local governments is affected by financial pressure from the perspective of financial incentives,which in turn affects the environmental performance of enterprises in the bailed-out areas.Based on the natural experiment of China’s agricultural tax reform,the environmental consequences brought about by the change of local government’s financial pressure were examined on the basis of the Annual Environmental Survey of Polluting Firms(AESPF)of China.The study found that the increase in local government financial pressure will lead to an increase in pollution emissions from enterprises in the jurisdiction,which is mainly the result of the local government’s trade-off between environmental protection and fiscal revenue,which will lead to the relaxation of environmental supervision by local governments.In view of this,the design of appropriate vertical financial compensation mechanism and effective environmental target constraints are of great enlightenment to weaken the strategic opportunistic tendency of local governments in environmental protection.

关 键 词：财政激励 环境监管 企业环境绩效 

分 类 号：X32[环境科学与工程—环境工程] X196[经济管理—政治经济学] F062.2