新疆自由贸易试验区虚拟产业集群形成的演化博弈研究  

Research on the evolutionary game theory on the formation of virtual industrial clusters in Xinjiang Pilot Free Trade Zone

作　　者：穆沙江·努热吉 王婷 Mushajiang Nureji;WANG Ting(School of International Economics and Trade,Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics,Urumqi,Xinjiang 830012)

机构地区：[1]新疆财经大学国际经贸学院,新疆乌鲁木齐830012

出　　处：《价格月刊》2025年第3期67-78,共12页

基　　金：新疆文化名家宣传思想文化青年英才项目“新疆自由贸易试验区数字化发展路径研究”;国家社会科学基金西部项目“基于边界效应的口岸经济与沿边地区经济协调发展新机制研究”(编号:20XJL005);新疆维吾尔自治区社科一般项目“新疆自贸试验区背景下口岸经济高质量发展模式及路径研究”(编号:2024BJL044)。

摘　　要：新疆自由贸易试验区对推动“一带一路”倡议实施,提升中国在国际竞争中的地位具有重要意义。通过构建虚拟产业集群,能有效打破新疆自由贸易试验区乌鲁木齐片区、霍尔果斯片区、喀什片区协同发展的空间壁垒,实现三个片区协同发展。基于演化博弈理论,构建自贸试验区内、自贸试验区外企业及政府为主体的三方演化博弈模型,对各博弈主体的演化稳定策略及博弈系统的渐近稳定性进行研究,并通过Matlab数值仿真分析不同因素对演化稳定性的影响。结果表明,存在使博弈三方同时选择参与虚拟产业集群构建策略处于长期稳定性的收益组合;政府在虚拟产业集群构建中起引导作用,政府选择“参与”策略的稳定性同政府资金支持成反比,同参与所获收益成正比;企业选择“入群”策略的稳定性同入群成本成反比,同入群收益与偏好、政府补贴,因消极或投机行为带来的损失成正比。Xinjiang Pilot Free Trade Zone is of great significance in promoting the implementation of the Belt and Road initiative and enhancing China's position in international competition.Through the construction of virtual industrial cluster,it can effectively break the spatial barriers of the coordinated development of Urumqi,Khorgos and Kashgar in Xinjiang Pilot Free Trade Zone,and realize the coordinated development of these three areas.Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model with enterprises and governments as the main players within and outside the pilot free trade zone,and studies the evolutionary stability strategy of each game subject and the asymptotic stability of the game system,and analyzes the influence of different factors on the evolutionary stability through Matlab numerical simulation.The results show that there is a long-term stable income combination that makes the three parties in the game to simultaneously choose to participate in the construction strategy of virtual industry clusters;The government plays a leading role in the construction of virtual industrial clusters,and the stability of the government's“participation”strategy is inversely proportional to the government's financial support and proportional to the benefits obtained from participation.The stability of the“joining the group”strategy chosen by enterprises is inversely proportional to the cost of joining the group,and the benefits and preferences of joining the group,as well as government subsidies,are directly proportional to the losses caused by negative or speculative behavior.

关 键 词：新疆自贸试验区 虚拟产业集群 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F752[经济管理—国际贸易]