基于演化博弈的养老PPP项目社会资本控制权配置研究  

Research on the Internal Control of Social Capital of PPP Projects for Elderly Care Services Based on Two Stage Evolutionary Game

作　　者：刘旦[1] 曹磊 Liu Dan;Cao Lei(School of Information Management and Mathematics Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics Nanchang 330013,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学信息管理与数学学院

出　　处：《科学.经济.社会》2025年第1期77-88,共12页Science Economy Society

基　　金：江西省社会科学“十四五”基金项目“人口老龄化背景下养老服务体系建设、制度保障与发展路径研究”(22GL12)。

摘　　要：针对养老PPP项目实践中存在的绩效不高问题,构建两阶段演化博弈模型,探讨了社会资本内部控制权配置模式。结果表明:金融机构控制权出让存在最优激励阈值,专业公司的经营能力和努力成本是影响金融机构控制权出让的关键因素。服务方适度参股能够提高项目绩效,服务方之间控制权配置取决于价值增值水平、努力成本和互惠性偏好。服务方内部控制权分配则与服务方的经营能力、价值贡献、互惠性偏好密切相关。最后,根据演化博弈结论提出了相关政策建议。In response to the problems of low execution performance and insufficient investment of social capital in the practice of elderly care PPP projects in China,this article constructs a two-stage evolutionary game model to explore the internal control allocation mode of social capital and its impact on project execution performance.The results indicate that there is an optimal incentive threshold for the transfer of control rights to financial institutions,and the operational capabilities and effort costs of professional companies are key factors affecting the transfer of control rights to financial institutions;Moderate equity participation by service providers can improve project performance,and the level of value appreciation,effort costs,and reciprocity preferences among service providers are key factors affecting the proportion of control rights of service providers.The operational capability,value contribution,and reciprocity preference of the service provider are key factors affecting the allocation of internal control rights of the service provider.Finally,relevant policy recommendations were proposed based on the conclusions of evolutionarygame theory.

关 键 词：养老PPP项目 执行绩效 两阶段演化博弈 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济]