雇员分红权激励与中央企业审计定价  

Employee Bonus Incentives Reform and Audit Pricing of Central State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：窦笑晨 黄晓珊 马新啸 Dou Xiaochen;Huang Xiaoshan;Ma Xinxiao

机构地区：[1]中国财政科学研究院,100142 [2]广州南方学院会计学院,510970 [3]中国海洋大学管理学院,266071

出　　处：《审计研究》2025年第2期71-83,共13页Auditing Research

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金第73批面上项目(项目批准号:2023M733331);国家自然科学基金青年项目(项目批准号:72302224);“泰山学者”工程专项经费项目(项目批准号:tsqn202306100)的资助。

摘　　要：科学合理的审计定价对激发微观主体动能和实现资本市场高质量发展至关重要。如何更好地借助分红权激励来调整、优化中央企业审计定价水平,成为新时代全面深化央企改革的一个现实问题。本文基于中央企业分红权激励改革的准自然实验,考察雇员分红权激励对中央企业审计定价的影响。研究发现,分红权激励不仅能够强化员工内部监督,还可以提升央企运营效率,从而降低审计师的审计投入和审计风险,由此降低中央企业审计定价。进一步研究表明,前述效果需要坚实的人才基础支撑,在人力资本结构较好和雇员稳定性较强的中央企业中更为明显,并且在地区人才培养水平较高、产业链不确定性较强的情况下更加突出;同时还能弥补会计师事务所审计能力不足的短板,在会计师事务所为非“十大”以及注册会计师数量较少的情况下更为显著。本文研究结果为推动完善央企产权制度改革提供了一定程度的经验证据。Audit pricing is of paramount importance for the high-quality development of market micro entities and the capital market. How to better optimize the audit pricing of central state-owned enterprises(central SOEs)through the bonus incentives reform constitutes a key link in the comprehensive deepening of central SOE reform in the new era. Based on the quasi-natural experiment on the bonus incentives reform in central SOEs, this paper systematically explores the effect of the bonus incentives reform on the audit pricing of central SOEs. This paper finds that the bonus incentives reform can not only strengthen internal employee supervision, but also improve the operational efficiency of central SOEs, so as to effectively reduce audit input and audit risk of auditors, and thus lower the audit pricing level of central SOEs. Further research shows that the aforementioned effect requires the support of competent human resources, which is more pronounced in central SOEs with better talent base, strong talent stability, as well as under circumstances where quality of human resources is higher and industrial chain uncertainties are stronger. And the aforementioned effect can also make up for the shortcomings of insufficient audit capabilities of accounting firms, which is more significant when accounting firms are non-“Top Ten” and the number of certified public accountants is small. This paper provides certain empirical evidence for promoting and improving the reform of central SOE's property rights system.

关 键 词：中央企业 产权权利束分割 分红权激励 审计定价 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]