信息搜寻行为对供应链CSR质量信号机制的影响  

The impact of information search behavior on quality signal mechanism based on corporate social responsibility in supply chain

作　　者：李余辉 徐炳姝 张榆芸 袁胜军[1] 范建昌 LI Yuhui;XU Bingshu;ZHANG Yuyun;YUAN Shengjun;FAN Jianchang(School of Business,Guilin University of Electric and Technology,Guilin 541004,China;School of Marketing and Logistics Management,Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]桂林电子科技大学商学院,广西桂林541004 [2]南京财经大学营销与物流管理学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2025年第3期87-103,共17页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72002094);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(22XJA630003,21XJA630009)。

摘　　要：本文研究消费者的信息搜寻行为对上游节点企业利用企业社会责任(CSR)手段传递产品质量信息这一间接共享机制的影响。本文考虑一条由制造商、零售商和采取信息搜寻行为的消费者构成的供应链,建立了基于CSR手段的上游质量信号博弈模型,考察了制造商基于CSR手段隐藏或披露自身质量信息的可行性,识别了适用性条件,刻画了信息搜寻行为对CSR行为和供应链成员业绩的影响特征。均衡结果表明,(1)当且仅当市场中完全不存在信息搜寻行为时,制造商可以在混同均衡的意义上通过策略性地不实施CSR行为来隐藏质量类型;(2)利用水平适中的CSR行为可以在分离均衡的意义上真实地披露质量信息,最具信号效率的CSR行为是最低的临界CSR水平所对应的分离均衡情形;(3)最有信号效率的CSR水平随着信息搜寻的消费者比例的增大而降低。信息搜寻行为对高质量制造商的均衡利润的影响依赖于上游节点企业通过CSR手段披露质量信息的信息成本效应,但该效应对零售商的决策和营利性没有任何影响。这些结果一方面揭示了制造商在存在消费者信息搜寻行为的市场中有基于CSR手段的质量披露动机,另一方面也提供了除现有的直接披露方式之外,实现质量信息共享的间接机制与方法。本文的研究结论在复杂的信息结构条件下可以为实践者选择直接或间接的信息共享方式提供决策参考。This study′s primary aim is to investigate the impact of consumers′information search behaviour on the quality signal mechanism based on Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR)in supply chains.We consider a supply chain consisting of an upstream manufacturer,a downstream retailer,and final consumers,with information search preference,and build a signalling model of sharing upstream quality information by CSR behaviours.It is assumed that the product made by the manufacturer has two different quality levels:high and low.It is also assumed that the manufacturer privately owns the information on the quality level.Before sales,the retailer and a portion of the consumers(without information searching preference)cannot observe the true quality state,while the other consumers(with information searching preference)can foreknow the true quality state through their information searching behaviours.Under this quality information asymmetry,the manufacturer tries to disclose quality information by its observable CSR strategy with the retailer and consumers(here,it is not necessary for information-searching consumers to infer quality level via CSR strategy due to the foreknowledge of quality information),and the manufacturer and the retailer transact with a wholesale price contract.We characterise the pooling equilibrium and the separating equilibrium of the model completely,examine the feasibility of hiding or disclosing real quality information via CSR strategy,identify the applicability conditions,and describe the impact of information search behaviour on CSR signal behaviour and the performance of supply chain members.The sequence of the game model is as follows.Firstly,the supplier chooses a CSR level and a wholesale price according to its will to disclose quality information,i.e.,a zero CSR level means no sharing and a greater than zero CSR level means sharing.Then,after observing the CSR level to form Posterior Bayesian belief on quality(and then form the expected demand),the retailer determines its order and retail pr

关 键 词：供应链 产品质量 信息搜寻 企业社会责任 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学] F270.2