数字平台自我优待的经济分析:竞争机理与福利效应  

Economic Analysis of Self-Preferencing by Digital Platforms:Competition Mechanism and Welfare Effects

作　　者：许恒 王申 Xu Heng;Wang Shen(Business School,China University of Political Science and Law;The Institute for Data Law,China University of Political Science and Law)

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学商学院 [2]中国政法大学数据法治研究院

出　　处：《管理世界》2025年第4期72-90,111,共20页Journal of Management World

基　　金：科学技术部国家重点研发计划“社会治理与智慧社会科技支撑”重点专项“平台经济领域垄断行为风险监测感知关键技术研究”(2022YFC3321000)的资助。

摘　　要：作为一种新型的竞争行为,数字平台的自我优待受到理论研究和竞争政策实践越来越多的关注,但关于自我优待的竞争效果和福利效应尚不明确,给相关的反垄断执法与竞争政策的实施带来挑战。本文通过构建经济学模型对自我优待的行为激励、竞争机理和福利效应进行了系统的规范性研究,为该领域的经济学分析提供研究框架和理论支撑。本文认为自我优待的实质是平台利用信息优势构建自营商品竞争优势的过程,平台上较大规模的转移消费者强化了平台实施自我优待的动机。结合平台自身和平台内经营者竞争策略特征,本文归纳出依附型、抗衡型和“内卷”型3类竞争机理并分析了相应的福利结果。本文进一步发现激烈的平台内竞争有利于自我优待实现平台、平台内经营者和消费者共赢的结果,且忠诚消费者在平台内竞争关系中起到重要的调节作用。基于此,监管者应充分认识自我优待的分配效应,同时激励数据驱动型创新、强化品牌战略,提高自营商品质量。本文不仅对自我优待行为的规范分析具有理论层面的边际贡献,同时也为优化数字经济竞争政策目标和实现平台经济高质量发展提供相应的实践方案。As a new type of competitive behavior,self-preferencing by digital platforms has received increasing attention from theoretical research and competition policy practice.But the competitive and welfare effects of self-preferencing are still unclear,posing challenges to relevant anti-monopoly enforcement and implementation of competition policy.By constructing an economic model,this article studies the behavioral incentives,competitive mechanisms as well as welfare effects of self-preferencing,providing a research framework and theoretical support for economic analysis in this field.This article argues that the essence of self-preferencing is the process in which platforms utilize information advantages to build competitive advantages for self-operated products.The large-scale of switching consumers on the platform strengthens the motivation for the platform to implement self-preferencing.Based on the competitive strategy characteristics of the platform and its operators,this article summarizes three types of competitive mechanisms:attachment type,confrontation type,and"involution"type,and analyzes the corresponding welfare results.This article further finds that intense competition within the platform is conducive to achieving a win-win situation for the platform,platform operators,and consumers through self-preferencing,and loyal consumers play an important regulatory role in the competitive relationship within the platform.Based on this,regulators should fully acknowledge the distributional effects of self-preferencing while simultaneously encouraging data-driven innovation,strengthening brand strategies,and enhancing the quality of self-operated products.This paper not only makes a theoretical contribution to the normative analysis of self-preferencing behaviors but also provides practical solutions for optimizing the objectives of competition policy in the digital economy and achieving high-quality development of the platform economy.

关 键 词：数字平台 自我优待 竞争机理 福利效应 忠诚消费者 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济]