邻避风险披露机制的网络沟通与劝说模型:私人信息源与信任驱动的学习  

Network Communication and Persuasion Model for NIMBY Risk Disclosure Mechanism:Private Information Sources and Trust-driven Learning

作　　者：余刘凯 Yu Liukai(School of Management,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China;School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学管理学院,湖北武汉430070 [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2025年第3期162-173,共12页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72171180);国家自然科学基金重点项目(72031009);国家社会科学基金重大项目(20&ZD058);国家留学基金管理委员会项目(202306270147)。

摘　　要：“实在风险—感知风险”的邻避风险链管控成为阻断邻避效应外化为社会稳定风险的关键。本文基于实在风险信息的非对称性,聚焦邻避风险沟通场景下管理者的风险披露机制设计。考虑居民的私人风险信息源、行动的全局网络外部性以及信任驱动的学习规则,刻画邻避事件中两类典型的沟通场景,即居民之间的策略性交互以及管理者对居民的劝说,旨在揭示居民感知风险的演变规律,并设计管理者最优公共风险披露机制。为此,本文基于网络Cheap talk理论与贝叶斯劝说理论,构建网络沟通与劝说理论模型。分析表明,管理者最优公共风险披露机制为确定性区间阈值推荐机制,其针对不同私人信息环境下的居民实施激励相容的差异化推荐,对越乐观的居民,机制推荐接受的风险区间越广。同时,私人信息源的负面强度与个数决定了管理者是否需要披露、如何披露以及披露的效果。此外,居民信任对基于该机制的劝说效果具有正向促进作用,然而,较悲观(高私人信息环境)居民的期望收益是信任的减函数,由此导致信任与社会总福利的非增关系。本文研究明确了管理者最优风险披露机制,并从私人信息源与信任两个维度为提升披露效果提供具体建议。The rapid development and transformation of the economy and society have led our country to gradually enter a high-risk society.With citizens’increasing awareness of risks and rights,the NIMBY(not in my backyard)effect has become a significant source of social stability risk.Managing the NIMBY risk chain,which involves transforming“actual risk”into“perceived risk”,is crucial for preventing the externalization of NIMBY syndrome into social stability risk.Based on the asymmetry of actual risk information,it aims to design the optimal risk disclosure mechanism for the administrator to address NIMBY syndrome.The residents’private risk information sources,global network externalities of residents’behaviors,and trust-driven learning rule are considered to model two typical communication scenarios in NIMBY events:strategic interactions among residents and risk disclosure from administrator to residents.In this way,a network communication and persuasion model is developed based on the Network Cheap talk and Bayesian persuasion theories.It is assumed that the administrator’s disclosure occurs after residents’private information learning and strategic communication within community.Thus,a Network Cheap talk model is constructed to depict the strategic communication process among heterogeneous residents,deriving the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and analyzing the consensus on community risk beliefs under the equilibrium condition,as well as changes in consensus based on different private information realizations.Based on this,a public risk disclosure mechanism is designed for the administrator.Since residents’private information serves as uncertain information for the administrator,the optimal mechanism must implement differentiated recommendations for residents based on different private signals while satisfying the incentive compatibility condition.Additionally,drawing from conservative Bayesianism,an affine distortion approach is employed to characterize resident’s trust-driven learning rule.The find

关 键 词：邻避风险沟通 私人信息源 信任驱动的学习 非贝叶斯劝说 机制设计 

分 类 号：C943[自然科学总论—系统科学]