谈判博弈下供应链的歧视定价与统一定价策略  

Discriminatory pricing and uniform pricing strategy of supply chain under bargaining game

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作  者:陈洪转[1] 闫飞 程硕 Chen Hongzhuan;Yan Fei;Cheng Shuo(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 210016,China)

机构地区:[1]南京航空航天大学,江苏南京210016

出  处:《系统工程学报》2025年第2期279-294,共16页Journal of Systems Engineering

基  金:国家社会科学基金资助项目(19BJY094);教育部人文社会科学规划基金资助项目(23YJA630009);中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金资助项目(NP2024201).

摘  要:考虑由一个供应商和两个具有不同谈判能力的制造商构成的两级供应链在谈判博弈模式下的歧视定价和统一定价问题.分别构建了歧视定价和统一定价两类谈判博弈模型,进而分析不同定价策略对供应链各方谈判能力、市场批发价格水平以及社会福利的影响,最后以线性需求函数为特例进行了分析和数据仿真.研究表明,让步成本是影响谈判能力的一个重要因子.歧视定价下,谈判批发价会随着各制造商的分歧利润、议价权重的增加而减小,并随着供应商分歧利润的增加而增加;统一定价策略增强了供应商的让步成本,进而提高了供应商谈判能力,因此,供应商将向谈判代表制造商收取更高的批发价格.统一定价策略和歧视定价策略对市场批发价格水平和社会福利的影响取决于下游两个制造商的谈判能力差异程度.研究结果解释了现实中企业在不同竞争市场中迥异的定价策略,也对供应商综合考虑谈判各方谈判能力以进行产品定价有重要的指导意义.The article studies the discriminatory and uniform pricing decisions of a two-echelon supply chain composed of a supplier and two manufacturers with different bargaining powers.The article establishes two bargaining power games for discriminatory pricing and uniform pricing,and further analyzes how the two different pricing decisions affect the bargaining power of supply chain members,the wholesale price,and the social welfare.The results show that the concession cost is an important factor affecting bargaining power;wholesale prices decrease with the manufacturer’s bargaining weights and disagreement payoffs,and increase with the disagreement payoffs of the supplier.The uniform pricing strategy enhances the supplier’s concession cost,thereby improving its bargaining power.The impact of uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing on the market wholesale price level and social welfare depends on the difference degree in the bargaining power of the two downstream manufacturers.These results explain the different pricing strategies offirms in different markets in reality and have important management implications for suppliers to consider the bargaining power when making pricing decisions.

关 键 词:谈判博弈 谈判能力 歧视定价 统一定价 

分 类 号:TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]

 

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