政府绩效评估中“避责共同体”的博弈策略  

Game Strategy of“Community of Responsibility Avoidance”in Government Performance Evaluation

作　　者：吴雨寒 WU Yuhan(School of Sociology and Political Science,Anhui University,Hefei,Anhui 230601,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽大学社会与政治学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《宜宾学院学报》2025年第4期48-54,共7页Journal of Yibin University

摘　　要：在政府绩效考核中,第三方评估团队实质上代表着省权。市、县、乡镇和村干部形成“避责共同体”,通过实施公关努力、社会交换和权力运用的博弈策略应对第三方评估团队的考核。村民作为“避责共同体”应对第三方评估团队考核任务的工具,博弈策略往往也会运用于村民。政府绩效评估中“避责共同体”及其博弈策略的盛行,关系着基层治理的成效,影响着国家治理体系和治理能力现代化建设。因此,政府应该从重塑基层干部的价值认知、建立健全资金管理制度和优化问责制度入手,构建起“不想避责、不能避责、不敢避责”的工作新生态。In government performance appraisal,the third-party evaluation team essentially represents provincial power.City,county,township,and village cadres often form a“community of avoidance of responsibility”,and they employ game strategies such as public relations efforts,social exchanges,and use of power to respond to assessments by third-party evaluation teams.Villagers,as a“community to avoid responsibility”,are used to deal with the assessment tasks of third-party assessment team,and game strategies are often applied to villagers.The prevalence of the“community of responsibility avoidance”and its game strategy in government performance evaluation is related to the effectiveness of grassroots governance and the modernization of national governance system and governance capacity.In order to correct this phenomenon,efforts should be made from three aspects:first,strengthening supervision over the whole process;second,establishing and improving the system for approving funds;and third,strengthening the constraints of the accountability system.

关 键 词：第三方评估团队 避责共同体 公关努力 社会交换 权力运用 

分 类 号：D035.5[政治法律—政治学]